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I. INTRODUCTION
Surprisingly, no one has yet examined the possibility that the existence 
of a fairly new and highly flexible business form, the limited liability com-
pany (hereinafter LLC), might have a negative effect on the application of 
the nexus of contracts theory to corporations.1 Widely debated by scholars 
of law and economics since the late 1970s,2 this concept posits that the cor-
1
 A considerable volume of research and writing has been done on both the nexus of contracts the-
ory and the LLC. Some authors suggest that the application or non-application of the nexus of contracts 
theory should be identical to all business forms. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 251 (1991) [hereinafter, EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL] (suggesting that courts assessing both corporations and partnerships should use as a default the 
likely intent of the parties, had they considered the point of dispute). Other authors use the unique set of 
characteristics enjoyed by the LLC to posit that the LLC is an effective contractarian business form, and 
that the success of the LLC might promote the application of contractarian principles to corporations as 
well. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80 
(1991) [hereinafter Ribstein, Limited Liability] (asserting that “the business trust and limited liability 
company statutes may be intermediate steps on the road to full recognition of private [contractarian] 
ordering, just as special chartering was an intermediate step toward the development of general incorpo-
ration statutes”). Id. at 126. No commentator has suggested that the nexus of contracts theory might 
validly be applied to the LLC and yet remain invalid with respect to corporations. In all fairness to these 
authors, it must be conceded that many of the seminal writings on the nexus of contracts theory were 
produced before the LLC developed widespread popularity. The earliest direct discussion of the applica-
tion of the nexus of contracts theory to the limited liability company appears to have occurred in a 1992 
comment, Jim Hyde, Comment, Constitutionally Mandated Fairness and the Limited Liability Com-
pany: An Argument for the Extra-Territorial Application of Limited Liability Company Statutes, 1 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 83 (1992) (arguing for recognition in all states of the limited liability inherent to LLCs 
formed in any state, based on the contractual nature of the entity combined with full faith and credit 
principles). Id. at 95-96.  
2
 See infra notes 143-49 and accompanying text for further discussion of the amount of commen-
tary generated by proponents and opponents of the nexus of contracts theory; see also Jonathan C. 
Lipson, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Power Imbalance and the Financially Distressed Corporation,
50 UCLA L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2003) (describing the debate over the nexus of contracts theory as “the 
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poration should be treated as a collection of contracts between interested 
parties.3 By contrast, the longstanding practice of judges has been to create 
and impose fiduciary duties—heightened standards of behavior—on corpo-
rate managers,4 irrespective of any contractual arrangements between the 
parties working for or within the corporation.5
Such court-imposed standards go far beyond the basic contractual re-
quirement of good faith and fair dealing.6 Certain fiduciary duties—such as 
the manager’s duty not to compete in business against his or her own corpo-
ration—can never be waived, even with the prior consent of both owners 
and managers of the corporation.7 Advocates of the nexus of contracts the-
ory, or contractarians,8 argue that the existing regime of mandatory fiduci-
principal corporate law discussion of the last twenty years”); Andrew D. Shaffer, LL.M. Thesis, Corpo-
rate Fiduciary—Insolvent: The Fiduciary Relationship Your Corporate Law Professor (Should Have) 
Warned You About, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 479, 483 n.12 (2000) (stating that “[a]n academic holy 
war exists over whether the fiduciary concept can be explained purely in terms of contract, or whether 
fiduciary relationship represents something more”). 
3
 See infra notes 110-59 and accompanying text for discussion of the nexus of contracts theory of 
corporations. 
4
 Following the example of David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201 
(1990), I note here that “the terms ‘management’ or ‘managers’ refer collectively to the corporation’s 
board of directors and senior officers.” Id. at 201 n.1. 
5
 See infra notes 80-109 and accompanying text for discussion of the existing regime of fiduciary 
duties.  
6
 See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. 
7
 See infra notes 101-109 and accompanying text for discussion of the waivability of fiduciary 
duties. Because corporations exist and operate in accordance with state statutes, it is, of course, within 
the power of state legislatures to explicitly eliminate fiduciary duties, or to make such duties optional 
provisions. Indeed many states have taken a small step in this direction by enacting statutes which allow 
corporate shareholders to waive the right to damages for breach of the duty of care normally owed by 
directors. See Fred S. McChesney, Legal Change and Small Business Law, 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING 
BUS. L. 1, 8 (1997) (stating that “Delaware statutorily allows shareholders to waive, with some minor 
exceptions, any duty of care they might otherwise be owed by their directors, as does the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act”); Robert B. Thompson, The Law’s Limits on Contracts in a Corporation, 15 J.
CORP. L. 377, 406 (1990) (noting that “[s]ince Delaware’s initial legislation on this subject in 1986, 
four-fifths of the states have added this option to their corporation statutes”). No state has yet made a 
similar allowance for waiver of damages liability for a breach the duty of loyalty. Neither has any state 
eliminated any of the commonly assessed fiduciary duties outright. 
8
 Columbia University Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., appears to have been the first author to 
apply the term “contractarian” to proponents of the nexus of contracts theory of corporations. See John 
C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 
COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989). The term itself has long enjoyed a broader application to those theorists 
who believe that society as a whole constitutes a social contract, or that the government of the United 
States constitutes a form of contract with the people. See, e.g., Nickolai G. Levin, Constitutional Statu-
tory Synthesis, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1281 (2003) (examining the “contractarian” underpinnings of the Con-
stitution’s separation of powers). This usage is discussed in EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 
15, who conclude that the arguments in favor of the existence of the ‘social contracts’ are, in fact, 
weaker than those supporting the nexus of contracts theory of corporations simply because “[t]he corpo-
rate venture has many real contracts.” Id. at 16 (emphasis added). Naturally, the ideological opponents 
of contractarians are generally referred to as “anti-contractarians”; see, e.g., Coffee at 1619; Henry N. 
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ary duties should be eliminated, and that the law of contract should serve as 
the sole touchstone for determining what responsibilities corporate manag-
ers owe to owners.9 Contractarians assert that if owners and managers were 
required to memorialize the duties owed by the latter to the former, then 
market forces would compel these parties to voluntarily arrive at a set of 
duties that maximize efficiency for the corporation and accountability to the 
shareholders.10
This comment will argue that application of the nexus of contracts 
theory to corporations has been undercut by the existence of the LLC. It 
first examines the historical foundations and current conditions of both the 
nexus of contracts theory, and of the judicial application of the fiduciary 
duties that contractarians would relegate to contractual gap-fillers.11 The 
various arguments raised by proponents of this theory are examined,12 and 
the failure of this theory to affect the jurisprudence of fiduciary duties is 
discussed.13 A similar examination follows of the historical foundations of 
the limited liability company and explains the course of its development, 
after a faltering start, into one of the most popular business forms.14 The 
different approaches taken by state legislatures and courts highlight the 
flexibility of this business form,15 and underscore how it is readily described 
as an actual nexus of contracts.16 Finally, this comment analyzes the impact 
of the LLC on the ongoing debate between contractarians and anticontrac-
tarians, and the particular debate among scholars and in the courts over the 
ability of LLC members to waive fiduciary duties. In conclusion, it reiter-
ates and supports the arguments for the existence of the LLC undermining 
application of the nexus of contracts theory to corporations. 
Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990). 
9
 See infra notes 110-111, 133-142 and accompanying text for discussion of waiver of duties 
under contractarian theory. 
10
 See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) available at
http://www.sciences-sociales.ens.fr/~adirer/textes/Jensen-Meckling.pdf (last visited March 8, 2004). See 
also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 12-22. 
11
 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 22. 
12
 See infra notes 116-127, 132-142 and accompanying text for discussion of the arguments raised 
by contractarians. 
13
 See infra notes 146-159 and accompanying text for discussion of the failure of courts to adopt 
the nexus of contracts theory, and the possibility that this theory may be judicially or legislatively 
adopted in the future. 
14
 See infra notes 190-226 and accompanying text for discussion of the creation and growing 
popularity of the LLC. 
15
 See infra notes 189-209, 241-272 and accompanying text for discussion of the various legisla-
tive and judicial actions taken with respect to the LLC. 
16
 See infra notes 227-272 and accompanying text for discussion of the contractarian nature of the 
LLC. 
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II. THEORIES OF THE FIRM: FIDUCIARY DUTIES,
AND THE NEXUS OF CONTRACTS
A.   How the Development of the Modern Corporation  
  Has Influenced Corporate Theory 
Corporate theory, policy, and practice constitute a never-ending circle 
of influences. Theories devised by economists and legal scholars to explain 
or justify the nature of business organizations influence the policy decisions 
made by courts, legislatures, and enforcement agencies.17 Practical concerns 
about the way the law ought to treat corporate activity have been influenced 
by “various theories of the corporation that have enjoyed prominence since 
the 19th century.”18 It has been noted that “particular theories of the corpo-
ration are perceived to justify particular legal rules or, at a more general 
level, a particular approach to regulation of business activity.”19 Policy deci-
sions, in turn, may lead to changes in the way business organizations oper-
ate in practice, as they strive to avoid costly legal conflicts, and perhaps to 
take advantage of perceived loopholes.20 These operational changes then 
lead to new theories, starting the cycle over again.21
17
 There have, however, always been a number of competing theories in play at any one time. As 
one commentator explains: 
American attitudes toward commerce and centralized accumulations of wealth have evolved over 
the years, but at no time has there been a single overarching attitude toward them. American politi-
cal culture contains a number of differing political and social traditions (e.g., liberalism, civic re-
publicanism, dissenting Protestantism) that have been woven together in the documents and ideas 
that make up our common culture. However, historians have also realized that no one of these tra-
ditions has ever been completely dominant. The history of American attitudes toward state char-
tered business organization reflects the tension between these various traditions. 
David L Cohen, Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability Company: How Should Courts 
and Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility and Securities Regula-
tion for the Limited Liability Company?, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 427, 432 (1998), citing: 
Note, Incorporating the Republic: The Corporation in Antebellum Political Culture, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1883 (1989) (arguing that different visions of republicanism and emerging liberalism defined 
and were defined by the emergence and triumph of the private business corporation); J.C.D.
CLARK, THE LANGUAGE OF LIBERTY 1660-1832 (1994) (arguing for the equal importance of proto-
liberal, republican and dissenting Protestant traditions in forming American political thought). 
Id. at note 5. 
18
 Millon, supra note 4, at 204, stating in full, “[m]y starting point is agreement with [Morton] 
Horwitz that the various theories of the corporation that have enjoyed prominence since the 19th century 
have influenced thinking about how the law should treat corporate activity,” (citing Morton Horwitz, 
Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 221-22 (1985) 
(discussing legal theories of the corporation in the first half of the Twentieth Century)). 
19
 Millon, supra note 4, at 204. 
20
 Businesses are not neutral players in this field, and theoretical exchange and the practical 
experience of lawmakers are not the only drivers of change in business law. Often different parties 
within a particular kind of business relationship seek to better their own position through efforts to 
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1.    Entity versus Aggregate 
Three dimensions have dominated theoretical discussion of the corpo-
ration.22 The first examines “the distinction between the corporation as an 
entity, with a real existence separate from its shareholders and other partici-
pants, and the corporation as a mere aggregation of natural individuals 
without a separate existence.”23 The work of E. Merrick Dodd, Jr.,24 high-
lights one theoretical leap made possible by the assumption that the corpo-
ration is an entity, as opposed to an aggregate, stating his belief: 
 . . . that public opinion, which ultimately makes law, has made . . .  
substantial strides in the direction of a view of the business corpora-
tion as an economic institution which has a social service as well as a 
profit-making function, that this view has already had some effect 
upon legal theory, and that it is likely to have a greatly increased effect 
upon the latter in the near future.25
persuade the legislature or the judiciary; see Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers v. Gwadosky, 304 
F.Supp.2d 104 (D.Me. 2004): 
The public tends to see the dealer-manufacturer relationship as symbiotic and unitary: the manu-
facturer designs and builds vehicles; the dealer sells and repairs them, all to their greater economic 
advantage. Beneath the surface, however, is an uneasy, often roiling relationship. Since the parties 
themselves have been unable over the course of the last three decades to negotiate satisfactorily 
their conflicting positions in the warranty reimbursement area, they have each periodically sought 
to enlist the support of the legislative and judicial arms of government. Each legislative action has 
been followed by resort to the judicial branch, spawning new legislation and new judicial rulings, a 
seemingly never ending cycle, perfectly exemplified by the instant case. 
Id. at 106-07. 
21
 The influences of Adolf A. Berle, Jr., and E. Merick Dodd, discussed infra note 24, offer a 
prime example of this principle at work, each having argued for a position which impacted the devel-
opment of the law, and which thereby caused changes in the behavior of businesses; see also Millon, 
supra note 4, at 211-31 (discussing how both the entity theory and the aggregate theory of corporations 
have enjoyed periods of prominence, during which each influenced the development of the law, which 
in turn changed the behavior of corporations). 
22
 Millon, supra note 4.  
23
 Id. at 201. 
24
 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., achieved prominence as a theorist of corporate duties in the 1930’s. 
Millon specifically references contentions raised in E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate 
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932) (asserting that fiduciary duties assessed to corporate 
managers should go beyond the shareholders, and should also be made protect employees and society in 
general). Dodd’s views sparked a public dialogue regarding the duties of corporate directors between 
himself and Adolf A. Berle, Jr., who advocated a strict application of fiduciary duty solely for the benefit 
of shareholders. See, e.g., ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). For a more comprehensive discussion of the debate between Berle and 
Dodd, see A. A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited 
Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33 (1991) (suggesting that the debate continues, at least in aca-
demic circles); Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law,
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861, 1868, 1881-96 (2003) (noting that Berle’s position ultimately prevailed). 
25
 Dodd, supra note 24, at 1148. 
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Recognizing the corporation and its shareholders as separate entities en-
abled theorists to analyze separately the shareholders’ interests, and the 
interests of the corporation itself. Thus is it noted that “[b]ecause manage-
ment worked for the corporation, its obligations to the shareholders were, at 
best, secondary and indirect.”26 Conflict purportedly arises when the inter-
ests of owners, who are typically passive investors, are separated from the 
interests of active managers.27 Adam Smith made this point eloquently well 
over 200 years ago: 
The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather 
of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, 
that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with 
which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their 
own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider atten-
tion to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily 
give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profu-
sion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management 
of the affairs of such a company. 28
Conceptually, therefore, a firm that is an independent entity creates a dis-
connect between the interests of shareholders and the interests of the man-
agers. The managers are most interested in improving their own lot.29 To the 
extent that managers work to further the interests of the shareholders, they 
are motivated by their desire to strengthen their own position within the 
corporation itself.30
2.    Artificial versus Natural Creation 
The second distinction raised is “between the corporation as an artifi-
cial creation of state law and the corporation as a natural product of private 
initiative.”31 The first of these possibilities is criticized as “the so-called 
‘concession’ theory . . . that corporations are creatures or concessions of the 
state rather than wholly the product of private contract.”32 Proponents of 
this theory pointed to the requirement that the corporation be created in 
26
 Millon, supra note 4, at 218. 
27
 See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 24, at 119-25. 
28
 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: COMPLETE AND UNABRIDGED 800 (Edwin Cannan 
ed., The Modern Library 2000) (1776) [hereinafter ADAM SMITH]. More recently, this sentiment has 
been restated in more direct language in JERRY W. MARKHAM & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 
AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 13 (2002): “The manager’s quest to maximize their [own] utility 
does not naturally lead to decisions that also maximize the value of the firm.” 
29
 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 12. 
30
 Id.
31
 Millon, supra note 4, at 201. 
32
 Ribstein, Limited Liability, supra note 1, at 85. 
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accordance with state law,33 and to the fact that corporations were initially 
chartered almost exclusively to serve purposes beneficial to the general 
public.34 If corporations are indeed properly classified as creations of state 
law, then the benefits of incorporation can be seen as a boon from the state, 
which justifies any restrictions that the state may choose to impose. Berle 
and Means identify three such restrictions that were typically imposed on 
corporations: 
(1) The enterprise was required to be defined and . . . limited in scope. 
. . .
(2) The contributions of capital were rigidly supervised. The corpora-
tion was not allowed to commence business until a certain amount of 
its shares had been “paid up.” . . . [and] additional shares issued 
should be paid for at a fixed minimum rate. 
(3) A rigid capital structure was set up. . . . the entire system [by which 
stocks were classified] had to be carefully laid out, embodied in the 
charter, and passed upon by the legislature.35
Additional restrictions have included measures designed to protect investors 
in corporations engaged in particular fields of business,36 and to protect 
corporate employees.37
If, on the other hand, corporations are the natural product of “private 
individuals and inevitable market forces,”38 then the state should be no more 
concerned with the operation of corporations than any other relationship 
bottomed on contractual obligations between parties. Although the state 
continues to maintain an interest in the behavior of managers with respect 
to their shareholders, it is informative to note that the protections identified 
by Berle and Means have been abridged or eliminated completely.39
33
 Millon, supra note 4, at 206. 
34
 J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1780-1970, at 15 (1970). Hurst expands upon this claim:  
Of the 317 separate-enterprise special charters enacted from 1780 to 1801 in the states, nearly two-
thirds were for enterprises concerned with transport (inland navigation, turnpikes, toll bridges); 
another 20 per cent were for banks or insurance companies; 10 per cent were for the provision of 
local public services (mostly water supply); less than 4 per cent were for general business corpora-
tions.  
Id. at 17. 
35
 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 24, at 122-23. 
36
 Millon, supra note 4, at 210 (identifying banking, transportation, and insurance companies as 
among those having special provisions “designed to protect the public from abusive practices”). 
37
 See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 57 (Consol. 1909) (holding shareholders liable for debts due 
to corporate “laborers, servants or employees”); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 106, § 61 (1882) (same). 
38
 Millon, supra note 4, at 213. 
39
 Id. at 212. 
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3.    Public Interest versus Private Concern 
The third distinction, which “has received a good deal less attention”40
examines whether the activities of corporations “justify a body of corporate 
law that is deliberately responsive to public interest concerns,”41 or whether 
the law should treat corporations as “governing little more than the private 
relations between the shareholders of the corporation and management.”42
Proponents of the nexus of contracts theory address each of the above 
dimensions.43 As noted above, contractarians characterize the corporation as 
the result of a combination of individual activities, and not as an entity in 
and of itself.44 They see the corporation as a creation of the choices of pri-
vate actors, only tied to the state by formalities,45 many of which are ulti-
mately unnecessary.46 Finally, they embrace Adam Smith’s concept of the 
invisible hand of the market,47 contending that the individuals engaged in 
the buying and selling of goods and services in a free market will naturally 
act in a way that promotes the best interests of society. Under such a view, 
the state need not interfere in the conduct of corporations in order to pro-
mote the general welfare. Furthermore, they contend that the state need not 
take special steps to protect corporate shareholders, for actors who choose 
to use the corporate form will tend to negotiate terms in this contract that 
are in the best interests of all constituents of the corporation. The role of the 
law, once again, should therefore be no more than the same enforcement of 
contracts as may occur in any other setting.48
B.  A Brief History of Ideas of the Corporation 
Because theories of the corporation are in part a function of their place 
in history, it is necessary to review the times and events which accompanied 
the ideological shifts that led to the current theories. The corporation in 
America began as a remnant of the English system, where market turbu-
lence caused by over-speculation in stock companies had led to the creation 
of the doctrine whereby the corporate charter could only be granted by the 
40
 Id. at 201. It is this distinction, however, which provides the basis for the debate between Adolf 
A. Berle, Jr. and E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., discussed supra note 19. 
41
 Id. at 201. 
42
 Id.
43
 See generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1. 
44
 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 9. 
45
 See, e.g., Ribstein, Limited Liability, supra note 1, at 86-87 (discussing different theories justi-
fying the existence of the filing requirement). 
46
 Id. at 86 (asserting that “state creation is an historical relic”). 
47
 ADAM SMITH, supra note 28, at 485.  
48
 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 8. 
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government.49 Parliament had “passed legislation that required a Royal 
charter for companies seeking investment funds from the public,”50 and that 
this “statute was imposed on the American colonies in 1741.”51 The United 
States Constitution left this question to the states.52
The popular conception of the corporation as a separate entity is long-
standing. “From the early years of the 19th century, certain legal attributes 
of incorporation encouraged Americans to conceive of the corporation as an 
entity existing separately from its shareholders and other participants.”53
Chief among these was the fact that the corporation could only be created 
by an act of the state.54 Initially, states required corporate filings to declare a 
specific purpose to which the corporation would then be limited—building 
a road between two particular towns, for example. 55 Legal action could be 
taken against the directors of a corporation that went beyond its charter by 
shareholders, by the corporation, or by the state itself.56 Because each cor-
poration initially had to be chartered by the legislature of its home state, 
“public suspicion about favoritism and corruption in the granting of corpo-
rate charters led some critics to advocate abolition of incorporation alto-
49
 MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 28, at 3- 4. 
50
 Id. at 4, noting also that “[t]he granting of corporate powers was viewed to [be] a prerogative of 
the government as early as 1612 . . . .” Id. at 4, n.7. See also ADAM SMITH, supra note 28, at 429-431 
(describing how corporations were formed primarily for the purpose of running townships). 
51
 MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 28, at 4. 
52
 Id.
53
 Millon, supra note 4, at 205-06. 
54
 Id. at 206.  
55
 See Wiswall v. The Greenville and Raleigh Plank Road Co., 56 N.C. (3 Jones Eq.) 183 (1857). 
In that case, a corporation had been set up to build a plank road between the cities referenced in its 
name, and to charge tolls upon that road. The managers sought to expand into the business of delivering 
mail, but stockholders easily persuaded the court to block this effort under the doctrine of ultra vires:
[A] corporation has a right to restrain by injunction the corporators from doing any act which is 
not embraced within the scope and purpose for which the corporate body was created, and which 
would be a violation of the charter; not only on the ground that such act would operate injuriously 
upon the rights and interests of the corporators, but on the further ground that a forfeiture of the 
charter would be thereby incurred.  
Id. at 18; see also Cent. R.R. Co. v. Collins, 40 Ga. 582 (1869) (enjoining one railroad corporation from 
buying a large amount of stock in another on the grounds that prospective purchaser’s corporate charter 
did not grant it the authority to invest corporate funds). 
56
 See Edward G. Reitler, Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce: Re-Examining Corporate 
Political Rights Under the First Amendment, 11 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 449, 454-55 (1991); Sandra K. 
Lueckenhoff, A. Lincoln, A Corporate Attorney and the Illinois Central Railroad, 61 MO. L. REV. 393, 
406 (1996) (stating that "typically based on a serious violation of the charter or a breach of legal proce-
dure, the attorney general brought suit against corporations to obtain a forfeiture of their charter," and 
remarking that "[t]he state was often successful in quo warranto cases" but that the courts "showed some 
reluctance to dissolve a corporation when the suit involved a successful business enterprise"); see also
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836-1937, at 46-47 (1991) (contending that 
quo warranto actions were almost exclusively taken against public utility corporations). 
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gether.”57 States instead responded by enacting laws that eliminated the 
specter of favoritism by “ordaining simple procedures that could be fol-
lowed by anyone seeking to incorporate.”58 As far back as the 1870s, some 
states began allowing the more relaxed standard of incorporation for the 
purpose of “carrying on any lawful business.”59
The relaxation of incorporation laws soon took on a more competitive 
purpose, which was of particular concern to Louis Brandeis, a turn-of-the-
century lawyer who became famous for representing the interests of labor,60
and who was ultimately appointed to the United States Supreme Court by 
his friend and confidant, Woodrow Wilson.61 As Justice Brandeis discusses 
in his famous dissenting opinion in Louis K Liggett Co v. Lee:62
The removal by the leading industrial States of the limitations upon 
the size and powers of business corporations appears to have been 
due, not to their conviction that maintenance of the restrictions was 
undesirable in itself, but to the conviction that it was futile to insist 
upon them; because local restriction would be circumvented by for-
eign incorporation. Indeed, local restriction seemed worse than futile. 
Lesser States, eager for the revenue derived from the traffic in char-
ters, had removed safeguards from their own incorporation laws.63
This effort by certain states to attract corporate business through the enact-
ment of the most relaxed set of incorporation laws has been widely charac-
57
 Millon, supra note 4, at 208 (citing JAMES W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS 
CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970, at 33-36 (1970) and MARVIN MEYERS,
THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION: POLITICS AND BELIEF 201 (1957)). But see Sommer, supra note 24, at 
36 (contending that fear of monopolization, and later of sheer economic power, were the driving forces 
behind suspicion of corporations): 
Throughout American history, the corporation has been an object of suspicion among the Ameri-
can people. This has derived, historically, from the fact that in its earliest incarnations, the corpora-
tion was equated with monopoly, and monopolies posed great opportunities for abuse. Then, as 
general corporation laws were liberalized and the limitations which had restrained the size of cor-
porate enterprises-limits on capitalization and duration and prohibitions against holding compa-
nies-were eliminated, the American public was frightened anew by the specter of enormous con-
centrations of power crushing them down. 
See also LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT, (Augustus M. 
Kelley Pub. 1971) (1914) [hereinafter BRANDEIS] (raising similar concerns about both monopolistic 
concentration in the banking industry, and the overwhelming economic power vested in corporations by 
virtue of the funds under their control). 
58
 Millon, supra note 4, at 208. 
59
 Id. at 208. Millon identifies laws to this effect that were enacted in Massachusetts in 1874, New 
York in 1875, and Maine in 1876. Id. at 208 n.32. 
60
 Norman Hapgood, Preface to BRANDEIS, supra note 57, at vii, xii. 
61
 Norman Hapgood, Foreword to BRANDEIS at xix, xxxii. 
62
 288 U.S. 517 (1933). 
63
 Id. at 557. 
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terized as a race to the bottom.64 The success of those states prompted fel-
low states to follow their example, as Brandeis explains in his Liggett dis-
sent: 
Companies were early formed to provide charters for corporations in 
states where the cost was lowest and the laws least restrictive. The 
states joined in advertising their wares. The race was one not of dili-
gence but of laxity. Incorporation under such laws was possible; and 
the great industrial States yielded in order not to lose wholly the pros-
pect of the revenue and the control incident to domestic incorpora-
tion.65
New York and New Jersey were at the forefront of the states that competed 
to make their laws the most favorable to potential incorporators—a battle in 
which New Jersey prevailed.66 As Brandeis remarks, “[b]y specifically pro-
viding that corporations might be formed in New Jersey to do all their busi-
ness elsewhere, the state made its policy unmistakably clear.”67 In 1910, the 
United States Supreme Court further spurred the selective incorporation 
movement by rejecting arguments raised in a series of cases that corpora-
tions could not operate outside the boundaries of their states of incorpora-
tion.68
64
 See generally Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 594 (2003); see 
also Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545, 586 (1984) 
(suggesting that a federal corporate law could prevent this phenomenon). In this era of globalization, 
this concept is no longer restricted to competition between states within the United States. See Clark D. 
Stith, Note, Federalism and Company Law: A “Race to the Bottom” in the European Community, 79 
GEO. L.J. 1581 (1991) (contending that the removal of political barriers between member nations in the 
European Community is likely to lead to a similar ‘race to the bottom’ between those nations, which will 
relax their national laws in an effort to attract firms from one another). But see EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 214-15 (arguing that this phenomenon could better be characterized as a “race 
to the top” because investors benefit from share price increases that tend to follow firms relocating to 
more corporate-friendly environs).  
65
 288 U.S. at 558-60. 
66
 Id. at 561-63. 
67
 Id. at 562-63. During the governorship of Woodrow Wilson, New Jersey ‘reformed’ its incorpo-
ration laws, leaving the field open for Delaware to become the state most conducive to incorporation; 
the authors illustrate the importance of this shift, noting that to this day, Delaware “is the place of incor-
poration of more than 50 percent of publicly traded corporations,” and that “it is the stated policy of the 
state to stand ready to change its laws to meet the requirements of its corporations chartered there.” 
MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 28, at 10. See also William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: 
Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 705 (1974) (describing Delaware’s success in the “race 
for the bottom”). 
68
 Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 416-17 (1910) (finding that an attempt by the state of 
Alabama to assess a tax on a foreign corporation that owned property in Alabama violated the Equal 
Protection clause); Ludwig v. Western Union Tel. Co., 216 U.S. 146, 164 (1910) (holding unconstitu-
tional a state statute that charged foreign corporations filing fees based on the value of their capital 
stock); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 18 (1910) (same); Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 
U.S. 56 (1910) (same). 
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The relaxation of the strictures on the formation of corporations natu-
rally increased both their popularity and the size of their operations. States 
not only eliminated the requirement of a state-granted charter but also re-
moved limits on the size, scope, and duration of the corporation. In his Lig-
gett opinion, Brandeis lamented the rise of giant corporate entities: 
The typical business corporation of the last century, owned by a small 
group of individuals, managed by their owners, and limited in size by 
their personal wealth, is being supplanted by huge concerns in which 
the lives of tens or hundreds of thousands of employees and the prop-
erty of tens or hundreds of thousands of investors are subjected, 
through the corporate mechanism, to the control of a few men.69
But it was not the size of these businesses alone that disconcerted Brandeis. 
He also raised concerns about the way that these changes affected the op-
erations of these companies: 
Ownership has been separated from control; and this separation has 
removed many of the checks which formerly operated to curb the 
misuse of wealth and power. And, as ownership of the shares is be-
coming continually more dispersed, the power which formerly ac-
companied ownership is becoming increasingly concentrated in the 
hands of a few.70
Brandeis was hardly the only person making such observations. In the 
1930’s, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means developed an influential new con-
ception of the public corporation, asserting that separation of ownership 
from control had become the norm,71 and that control had evolved into pro-
fessional management by persons more interested in their own entrench-
ment than in advancing the interests of shareholders. Their solution was to 
“view management’s role as that of trustee for the shareholders,”72 asserting 
that “[t]he law holds the management to certain standards of conduct. This 
is the legal link between ownership and management:73
The three main rules of conduct which the law has developed are: (l) a 
decent amount of attention to ‘business’; (2) fidelity to the interests of 
the corporation; (3) at least reasonable business prudence . . . .The law 
sums up the three rules above mentioned by saying that the manage-
69
 288 U.S. at 565. 
70 Id.
71
 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 35. See also Peter A. Gourevitch, Book Review, The Politics of 
Corporate Governance Regulation by Mark Roe, 112 YALE L.J. 1829, 1837 (2003) (discussing Roe’s 
interpretation of the work of Berle and Means). 
72
 Millon, supra note 4, at 221. 
73
 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 24, at 220. 
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ment stands in a “fiduciary” capacity towards the corporation. Since 
the corporation is a distinct legal identity, separate and apart from 
stockholders, it may become necessary to determine whether a direc-
tor can be honest and faithful with regard to the whole corporation at 
the same time that he is taking a hostile position towards an individual 
shareholder.74
Berle and Means see the solution in a view taken by some courts at the 
time: 
A minority of courts in the United States adopt the view that the direc-
tor may not use his position to advantage himself against the interests 
of any of his shareholders; if he proposes to deal with them he must 
disclose what he knows, so that the stockholder is at least as able to 
deal intelligently as is the director himself.75
The concept that the managers of the corporation held the investment of the 
shareholders in trust, and therefore bore the responsibilities of trustees, was 
therefore not entirely new to the courts. Indeed, this thinking was exempli-
fied in the Michigan Supreme Court’s 1919 decision in Dodge v. Ford Mo-
tor Co.76 In that case, the court ruled that Henry Ford could not lower prices 
and expand production for the express purpose of bettering society; Ford 
had a legal duty to run his business “primarily for the profit of the stock-
holders.”77
C.  The Jurisprudence of Fiduciary Duties 
1.    The Development of Corporate Fiduciary Duties 
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts defines the fiduciary relationship 
as one which “exists between two persons when one of them is under a duty 
to act for or to give advice for the benefit of another upon matters within 
the scope of the relation.”78 One commonly cited prerequisite to the fiduci-
ary relationship is dependency of one party upon another: “fiduciary duty 
74
 Id. at 220, 221-22. 
75
 Id. at 225. 
76
 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).  
77
 Id. at 684. 
78
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959). But see John H. Langbein, The Contractarian 
Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 629 (1995): 
[D]espite decades of pulpit-thumping rhetoric about the sanctity of fiduciary obligations, fiduciary 
duties in trust law are unambiguously contractarian. The rules of trust fiduciary law mean to cap-
ture the likely understanding of the parties to the trust deal, which is why both the duty of loyalty 
and the duty of prudence yield to the more particularized intentions that the parties may choose to 
express or imply in their trust deal. 
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obligates the stronger party precisely because of the relative weakness of 
the other party.”79 The fiduciary relationship is a venerable institution, hav-
ing existed in Anglo-American jurisprudence for over a quarter-
millennium.80 Nevertheless, it bears noting that “the exact contours of the 
concept have remained elusive”81 and that “the historical development of 
the law of fiduciary obligation is crucial to an understanding of its elusive-
ness.”
82
Fiduciary duties are a descendant of the equitable principles underpin-
ning the law of trusts.83 “[C]ases from the late 18th century were based on 
the broad general principle ‘that if a confidence is reposed, and that confi-
dence is abused, a court of equity shall give relief.’”84
Equity granted relief—and common law courts did not—in numerous 
situations involving one person’s abuse of confidence reposed in him 
by another. As Equity evolved, concrete rules in many instances sup-
planted the chancellors’ exercise of discretion based on broad princi-
ples; established usages for terms like “trust” and “confidence” re-
placed an earlier and imprecise vocabulary.85
While trusts came to have a very specific meaning, there was no term to 
describe other relationships in which such confidences were reposed. The 
word ‘fiduciary’ came to apply to “situations falling short of ‘trusts’ but in 
which one person was nonetheless obliged to act like a trustee.”86 The as-
signment of fiduciary duties to corporate officers stems from agency princi-
ples that were applied in partnerships,87 although “fiduciary duties among 
members of business entities today exist as a result of both statutory and 
common law development.”88 The imposition of fiduciary duties is intended 
to exact a particularly high standard of conduct on the person who is re-
79
 Claire Moore Dickerson, Is It Appropriate to Appropriate Corporate Concepts: Fiduciary 
Duties and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 111, 116 (1993) [hereinafter 
Dickerson, Fiduciary Duties]. 
80
 Shaffer, supra note 2, at 482. 
81
 Id.
82
 Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 
879, 880 (1988). 
83
 Dickerson, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 79, at 115-16. 
84
 Shaffer, supra note 2, at 483 (citing Leonard Sedgwick Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69 (1962)), who was in turn quoting Lord Thurlow in Gartside v. Isherwood, 28 Eng. 
Rep. 1297, 1298 (1783), citing Filmer v. Gott, 2 Eng. Rep. 156 (1774). 
85
 DeMott, supra note 82, at 880. 
86
 Id.; see also Shaffer, supra note 2, at 483. 
87
 Tammy Savidge Moore, Note, The Policy of Opting-Out of Fiduciary Duties in a Limited 
Liability Company: McConnell v. Hunt Sports Enterprises, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 183, 187-88 (2000). 
88
 Id. at 187. 
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quired to observe them. As Judge Cardozo famously wrote in Meinhard v. 
Salmon:89
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those act-
ing at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A 
trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market 
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensi-
tive, is then the standard of behavior.90
Assessing fiduciary duties to managers of a corporation is not so obvious a 
direction that the business world would otherwise grind to a halt, but nei-
ther is it any great leap away from logic: 
Not surprisingly, the corporate form of business organization proved 
to be fertile ground for application and development of fiduciary prin-
ciples. A corporation’s directors occupy a trustee-like position: unlike 
trustees, directors do not themselves have legal ownership interests in 
transferable property beneficially owned by others, but, like trustees, 
directors are entrusted with powers to use in the interest of others. In-
vested by corporation statutes with discretionary authority to manage 
or supervise the management of the corporation’s business, directors 
are bound by fiduciary principles.91
Cases like Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919), lay the 
foundation for the development of this judicial regime of corporate fiduci-
ary duties. The concentration of corporations in Delaware, with its special-
ized court of equity, promoted the development of this regime: 
In the corporate context in the United States, the continued evolution 
of fiduciary norms was shaped significantly by the institutional fact 
that the most prominent corporate law court—Delaware’s Chancery 
Court—was (and still is) a separate court of equity, operating with a 
self-consciously equitable style.92
2.    The Nature of Corporate Fiduciary Duties 
In corporate jurisprudence, fiduciary duties have developed into famil-
iar categories, the most commonly assessed being the duty of care and the 
89
 164 N.E. 545 (1928). This case has become shorthand for the proposition that parties to certain 
business relationships—‘coadventurers’ in this case, “owe to one another . . . the duty of the finest 
loyalty . . . . Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive . . . . ” Id. at 546. Of 
some tangential interest is the fact that a search of both Westlaw and Lexis turns up no earlier case 
containing the word ‘punctilio.’ 
90
 Id. at 546. 
91
 DeMott, supra note 82, at 880-81. 
92
 Id. at 881. 
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duty of loyalty.93 The duty of care requires that corporate managers inform 
themselves of all material facts before undertaking a decision on behalf of 
the corporation. This duty is mitigated by a number of factors, including the 
right of managers to rely on the reports of experts rather than investigating 
every pertinent fact themselves. Managers can also avail themselves of the 
business judgment rule, a standard applied by courts under which managers 
will be held harmless for the informed business decisions that they make, 
even if the decisions turn out poorly for the corporation.94
In the case of Smith v. Van Gorkom,95 however, the Supreme Court of 
Delaware found that the managers of a company who sold the company for 
a profit were nonetheless liable for violating the duty of care because they 
had not sought a proper valuation of the company before they voted.96 Even 
though the shareholders had endorsed the deal, which would normally be 
sufficient to alleviate the managers from responsibility for wrongdoing, the 
court found that the managers in this case had failed to inform the share-
holders of their failure to seek a valuation of the company.97 Therefore, the 
court would not release the managers from liability based on the vote of the 
shareholders.98 The Van Gorkom decision had an immediate and profound 
impact. Following this decision, Delaware “enacted legislation that allowed 
corporations to remove directors from the duty of care,”99 and a majority of 
other states followed suit.100 Once this legislation was enacted, the option 
was followed up by “some ninety percent of Delaware corporations.”101
93
 Moore, supra note 87, at 188. 
94
 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 93. 
95
 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
96
 Id. at 893. 
97
 Id.
98
 Id.
99
 MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 28, at 250.  
100
 See Thompson, supra note 7, at 406 n.165 (“The only states that do not permit some waiver 
are: Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Missouri, Nevada, North Dakota, South Carolina, Vermont, 
and West Virginia.”); accord MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 28, at 250. See also PAT K. CHEW,
DIRECTORS’ & OFFICERS’ LIABILITY 365-370 (2001) (discussing variations among the states in waiver 
provisions). Chew identifies the following variations: 
Variations from the Delaware statute include:  
• allowing officers as well as directors to be covered by these provisions, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
78.037(1) (Michie 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-7(3) (West 1989);  
• varying the exceptions to include such acts as “reckless disregard for the director’s duty . . . in 
circumstances in which the director was aware, or should have been aware, . . . of a risk of serious 
injury,” or acts constituting “an unexcused pattern of inattention that amounts to an abdication of 
the director’s duty”, CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(10)(A) (West 1987); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 
402(b) (McKinney 1998);  
• providing that provisions are applicable only to actions brought by the corporation or on behalf 
of the corporation (shareholder derivative suits), CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(10)(A) (West 1987) or 
by the shareholders, N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 402(b) (McKinney 1998);  
105
202 FIU Law Review [1:185
No such blanket waiver has been made available for the duty of loy-
alty, which requires that managers “refrain from competing with the corpo-
ration and . . . refrain from appropriating corporate opportunities.”102 This 
duty is often raised when a manager simultaneously serves on the board of 
directors of multiple corporations which do business with one another.103
The business judgment rule is not applied where a breach of the duty of 
loyalty is alleged—for example, where a manager takes a potential corpo-
rate opportunity for his own use, the manager cannot then claim that there 
was no violation because the opportunity would have been beyond the 
means of the corporation.104 The manager in such a scenario may only take 
advantage of such an opportunity if the corporation’s board of directors 
makes an informed rejection of the opportunity. Even more absolute is the 
prohibition against the manager engaging in competition against his own 
corporation.105 While the duty of loyalty can be overcome “by a showing of 
disclosure and consent,”106 manifested by a vote of approval by disinter-
• imposing a maximum dollar amount for which directors are liable, VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
692.1(A) (Michie 1988); and  
• automatically limiting directors’ liability unless the corporation elects otherwise (“opt-out” provi-
sions), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (West 1999) in contrast to Delaware’s requirement 
that corporations affirmatively adopt charter provisions limiting directors’ liability (“opt-in” provi-
sions), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991 & Supp. 1994). 
Id. at 370. 
101
 MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 28, at 250. 
102
 Moore, supra note 85, at 189. 
103
 See, e.g., Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 121 N.E. 378 (N.Y. 1918) (Cardozo, J.) 
(holding that a party who simultaneously served as the director of two corporations breached his fiduci-
ary duty to one corporation by failing to warn that corporation’s board of directors of his plan to exploit 
their contract with his other corporation). Note that BRANDEIS, supra note 57, at 51-68, would have 
severely restricted managers from holding multiple directorates, contending: 
The practice of interlocking directorates is the root of many evils. It offends laws human and di-
vine. Applied to rival corporations, it tends to the suppression of competition and to violation of 
the Sherman law. Applied to corporations which deal with each other, it tends to disloyalty and to 
violation of the fundamental law that no man can serve two masters.  
Id. at 51. 
104
 See, e.g., Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934) (holding that directors of an 
insolvent corporation could not take for themselves an opportunity within the corporation’s line of 
business, despite the contention of said directors that the corporation was financially incapable of taking 
on the opportunity). 
105
 This prohibition is traditionally encompassed within the duty of loyalty. See Barbara Ann 
Banoff, Company Governance Under Florida’s Limited Liability Company Act, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
53, 62 (2002): 
[T]he duty of loyalty . . . is divided into three parts: (1) the duty to account for property, profits, or 
benefits derived from the partnership's business or the use of partnership property, which includes 
partnership opportunities; (2) the duty not to deal with the partnership as an adversary or on behalf 
of adverse interests; and (3) the duty not to compete with the partnership. 
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 Dickerson, Fiduciary Duties, supra note 79, at 116-17. 
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ested members of the Board of Directors, this process is both cumbersome 
and applicable only on a case-by-case basis.107
D. Development of the Nexus of Contracts  
Theory of Corporations 
Contractarians would turn corporate fiduciary duties on their head, and 
would either require parties dealing with the corporation (including share-
holders) to contract with the corporation for such duties to be mandated;108
or would at least allow such parties to waive all such duties in their deal-
ings.109 Of course, both the limited liability company and the nexus of con-
tracts theory are still very young developments when taken in the context of 
the long history of business organizations.110 It was not until 1976 that Mi-
chael Jensen and William Meckling first expressed their theory that the 
corporation could be conceived as a nexus of contracts.111 Jensen and Meck-
ling’s work was, in turn, based on a 1937 article authored by Ronald 
Coase,112 for which Coase would eventually win the Nobel Prize.113 The 
ideas that underpin Coase’s thesis and also provide the underlying founda-
tion for the nexus of contracts theory can be traced back much further still, 
to Adam Smith’s conception that the self-interest of market participants 
would have the unintended effect of regulating the market to the ultimate 
107
 See id., stating: 
Fiduciary duty, once imposed, may be removed . . . . If a beneficiary knows all relevant facts about 
a fiduciary’s proposed act and consents to it, the fiduciary has not breached the duty of loyalty. 
Similarly, if the beneficiary asks the fiduciary to work toward a particular result, but the fiduciary 
states that time pressures will compromise the level of care, and the beneficiary nevertheless urges 
the fiduciary to act, that fiduciary will not be liable for a breach of the duty of care if the fiduci-
ary’s failure is within the scope of the disclosure. For a fiduciary to avoid the burden of a duty by 
disclosing to and obtaining consent from the beneficiary, the disclosure must be on a case-by-case 
basis; the fiduciary cannot seek a blanket approval of all subsequent acts. A mandatory core of ob-
ligation, consequently, precludes the beneficiary’s prospective waiver of the fiduciary’s duties of 
loyalty and care. Moreover, even the case-by-case waiver must be obtained in good faith . . . the 
traditional standard of good faith for these purposes appears to be higher than the standard applied 
in arm’s length commercial transactions. 
108
 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 12-22. 
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 See generally MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 28, at 1-4, noting that variations of the corpo-
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nally developed by the predecessor to the modern American corporation, the joint-stock company. 
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 Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts and the 
Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819 (1999) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Dual Nature]. In support of 
this proposition, Eisenberg cites Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10. 
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 Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 387-89 (1937), reprinted in
RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33 (1988). 
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 Id.; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 9 (2002) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Board of Directors] (stating that “[t]his model’s origins fairly 
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benefit of all parties.114 Among Smith’s most famous observations was the 
following: 
As every individual, therefore, endeavors as much as he can both to 
employ his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct 
that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value, every indi-
vidual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society 
as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the 
public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring 
the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his 
own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its 
produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, 
and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to 
promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always 
the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own 
interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually 
than when he really intends to promote it.115
Smith was suggesting that, left to its own devices, the market would regu-
late itself—and in so doing, would optimize the distribution of goods and 
services to those who desired them. Coase, assuming that this was the case, 
asserted that “[i]f rights to perform certain actions can be bought and sold, 
they will tend to be acquired by those for whom they are most valuable 
either for production or enjoyment.”116 In such a system, Coase wondered, 
why do firms exist at all?117 He reasoned that if there were no transaction 
costs, then there would be no reason for individuals to engage in business 
by any means other than by each individual immediately purchasing what-
ever goods or contracting out every service they required from another in-
dividual. Coase also argued that in a world without transaction costs, the 
remaining costs and benefits realized by parties to a market regulated by 
laws would be unchanged if those laws were repealed; only the mechanisms 
by which the costs were extracted and benefits conferred would change.118
Coase notes with apparent pride, however, that a later commentator on his 
work had stated that “[t]he world of zero transaction cost turns out to be as 
strange as the physical world would be without friction.”119
114
 See generally ADAM SMITH, supra note 28. 
115
 Id. at 484-85. 
116
 COASE, supra note 112, at 12. 
117
 Id. at 5. 
118
 Id. at 37-38. 
119
 Id. at 14. 
2006]    Application of the “Nexus of Contract” Theory to Corporations 205
But transaction costs do exist, and they place a heavy burden on busi-
ness.
120
 Coase affirms: 
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover 
who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one 
wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up 
to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection 
needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, 
and so on.121
Coase concludes that the firm is simply the most efficient means of reduc-
ing these transaction costs.122 In the conception of the firm that Coase de-
rives from this chain of thought, the firm is really nothing more than a col-
lection of shortcuts to avoid transaction costs, a system that guarantees an 
automatic repeat customer for each of the transactions that would otherwise 
require the parties involved to search out market information and make new 
contracts on a continual basis.123 This theory captures both the basis for the 
existence of the firm, and the logical limits to which such cost avoidance 
can be carried: 
[A]lthough production could be carried out in a completely decentral-
ized way by means of contracts between individuals, the fact that it 
costs something to enter into these transactions means that firms will 
emerge to organize what would otherwise be market transactions 
whenever their costs were less than the costs of carrying out the trans-
actions through the market. The limit to the size of the firm is set 
where its costs of organizing a transaction become equal to the cost of 
carrying it out through the market. This determines what the firm 
buys, produces and sells.124
This determination also points to an understanding of the regulations that 
underpin the existence of firms. Coase suggests that these are not solely 
predicated on the enforcement of competition, but also on the desire to 
make trade more efficient for the organizers of the firm. He states that 
economists such as Adam Smith, “ignore or . . . fail to emphasize an alter-
native explanation for these regulations: that they exist in order to reduce 
transaction costs and therefore to increase the volume of trade.”125
120
 At least one commentator has observed, however that “[w]hile economists see transaction costs 
as a deadweight loss, lawyers and accountants see them as a livelihood.” Banoff, supra note 105, at 80 
n.115. 
121
 COASE, supra note 112, at 6. 
122
 Id. at 38-39. 
123
 Id.
124
 Id. at 7. 
125
 Id. at 9. Coase follows this with a lengthy quote from Adam Smith wherein the latter suggests 
that every dealer in goods has an interest in widening the market and reducing competition, but that the 
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Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., would later popularize the term “con-
tractarians” as the designation for proponents of this theory in a 1989 publi-
cation.126 Naturally, contractarians and anticontractarians alike have en-
gaged in a seemingly endless variety of disputes regarding the merits of this 
position. 127 Even among the contractarians, different explanations are put 
forth as to how exactly the firm functions as a nexus of contracts.128 A num-
ber of commentators have specifically taken issue with the phrase, nexus of 
contracts, and the implication that corporate dealings should therefore be 
examined only through the lens of the law of contracts.129
The nexus of contracts theory follows the lead that Coase established 
and asserts the position that “[t]he private corporation or firm is simply one 
form of legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships 
and which is also characterized by the existence of divisible residual claims 
on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can generally be sold 
without permission of the other contracting individuals.”130 Followers of 
this theory have proposed “that all duties in a corporation can be contracted 
for or away and that the duties set forth in statutory and common law are 
only part of an ‘off the rack’ model.”131 Building on a tradition that reaches 
back to Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations,132 more recent commentators 
within this school have suggested that, if left to its own devices, the corpo-
latter goal is harmful to the public. Coase reads Smith as arguing that regulations should be tailored so 
as to avoid narrowing competition. Id.
126
 See supra note 8. 
127
 Stephen Bainbridge claims that, “contractarians and non-contractarians no longer have much of 
interest to say to one another—we pass like two ships in the night with an occasional exchange of 
broadsides.” Bainbridge, Board of Directors, supra note 113, at 7. 
128
 Id. (arguing that the board of directors of a corporation is itself the nexus of contracts).  
129
 See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract 
Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697 (1990). Braucher notes that even where exchanges fall squarely 
within the purview of contract law “[t]he law prohibits or makes unenforceable certain harsh terms and 
contracts because of doubt that they can be validly entered into; the suspicion is that only knowledge, 
power and judgment problems (often combined with lack of wealth) could produce them.” Id. at 717. It 
has further been noted that the “the term contract often carries unwanted legal meanings,” and therefore 
“can deter rather than promote an understanding of complex legal organization.” Oliver E. Williamson, 
The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties: An Introduction, in THE FIRM AS A NEXUS OF TREATIES (Masahiko 
Aoki et al. eds., 1990). Some authors have therefore suggested that a more appropriate term would be a 
nexus of treaties, See generally THE FIRM AS A NEXUS OF TREATIES (Masahiko Aoki et al, eds. 1990).
This has yet to prove a popular alternative. Others have attempted to offer a definition of contracts 
specific to this theory; see, e.g., Eisenberg, Dual Nature, supra note 86, at 822 (contending that “the 
conception means that the corporation is a nexus of reciprocal arrangements”). 
130
 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 10, at 9. See also MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 28, at 14.  
131
 Cynthia S. Grandfield, The Reasonable Expectations of Minority Shareholders in Closely Held 
Corporations: The Morality of Small Business, 14 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 381, 396 (2002), (citing Melvin A. 
Eisenberg, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1461 (1989) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Contractual Freedom]). 
132
 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 8; see also Bainbridge, Board of Directors, supra
note 113, at 18. 
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ration will be driven by market forces to adopt by contract with investors 
the strictures most appropriate to the needs of those investors. This theory 
challenges the longstanding and well-developed practice of courts with 
regards to corporate managers, which is to impose upon them fiduciary 
duties of care and loyalty above and beyond anything that has been put to 
writing by the parties involved with the transactions of the firm.133 Contrac-
tarians perceive this venerable line of decisions as a burdensome and un-
necessary meddling in the exchanges freely bargained for in the business 
world.134 Rather than impose such duties purely as a matter of principle, 
contractarians urge that where disputes arise over the behavior of managers 
and directors, “court[s] should attempt to discover what term rational par-
ties would have agreed upon had they focused on the matter.”135
In the words of the Supreme Court of Delaware, “[t]he most funda-
mental principles of corporate governance are a function of the allocation of 
power within a corporation between its stockholders and its board of direc-
tors.”136 Easterbrook and Fischel, dedicated contractarians, suggest that 
most states have left the details of this allocation largely in the hands of the 
parties involved: “The corporate code in almost every state is an “enabling” 
statute . . . [which] allows managers and investors to write their own tickets, 
to establish systems of governance without substantive scrutiny from a 
regulator.”137 Easterbrook and Fischel cite the application of the business 
judgment rule as further evidence of a proper policy of judicial non-
interference with the corporate form.138 They argue that “the dynamics of 
the market drive [managers] to act as if they had investors’ interests at 
heart,”139 and even invoke the ghost of Adam Smith’s invisible hand.140
E.  Application of the Nexus of Contracts  
Theory of Corporations by Courts 
The debate ignited by the publication of the nexus of contracts theory 
has been referred to as “the principal corporate law discussion of the last 
twenty years.”141 The theory has “gained support from economists and law-
133
 Butler, supra note 8, at 11-12. 
134
 Id. at 53-54. 
135
 Coffee, supra note 8, at 1622. 
136
 MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1126 (Del. 2003).  
137
 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 2. 
138
 Id. at 3. 
139
 Id. at 4. 
140
 Id. (stating “It is almost as if there were an invisible hand.”). Compare ADAM SMITH, supra 
note 28, at 421. 
141
 Lipson, supra note 2, at 1192. 
108
208 FIU Law Review [1:185
yers in recent years,”142 while having “provoked harsh responses from nu-
merous traditional legal scholars.”143 Despite this flurry of discussion, this 
theory remains confined to academic publications as opposed to court deci-
sions. It has been observed of the contractarians, however, that “their efforts 
have proved to be unpersuasive in the legislatures and courts.”144 This point 
appears to remain valid, as courts continue to impose fiduciary duties on 
corporate managers, and even to expand upon them.145 Some commentators 
contend that under some circumstances, managers should be deemed to owe 
fiduciary duties to other interested parties, such as creditors146 and employ-
ees.
147
 It is not surprising that the nexus of contracts concept has never 
gained ground with courts that would be exceedingly reluctant to remove 
judge-made devices perceived to protect individuals in their dealings with 
powerful corporate entities. Naturally, the application of this theory by the 
courts would vitiate the jurisprudence of corporate fiduciary duties. Such 
duties are often established in the decisions of courts, as they are rarely 
142
 Butler & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 3, citing COASE, supra note 112; Jensen & Meckling, supra
note 10; Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983); Klein, 
Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Proc-
ess, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110 (1965). Butler and Ribstein also count themselves among supporters of this theory; See also
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1; Bainbridge, Board of Directors, supra note 113. 
143
 Butler & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 3-4. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance: 
Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM, L. REV. 1403 (1985); Kenneth B. Davis, Judi-
cial Review of Fiduciary Decision-Making: Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1 
(1985); Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 303 (1999); 
Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Obligation Under Intellectual Siege: Contemporary Challenges to the 
Duty to be Loyal, 30 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 471 (1992); Alison Grey Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: 
Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738 (1978); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary 
Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209 (1995); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of 
Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1993). 
144
 Millon, supra note 4, at 204. 
145
 See, e.g., Paramount Communications v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) (impos-
ing heightened judicial scrutiny on the use of defensive measures by a corporation’s board of directors 
carried out under the guise of creating a strategic alliance with another company).  
146
 See, e.g., Shaffer, supra note 2 (arguing that fiduciary duties to creditors should be assessed to 
corporate managers “within the period (or some portion of the period), after a corporation is in financial 
distress and thereafter until a corporation returns to solvency or files a bankruptcy petition”), id. at 512; 
but see Lipson, supra note 2 at 1189 (criticizing “the widely held view that the fiduciary duties that 
corporate directors ordinarily owe to or for the benefit of shareholders should ‘shift’ to creditors when 
the corporation is in financial distress”). 
147
 See, e.g., Marleen A. O’Connor, Restructuring the Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recog-
nizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1260 (1991) (arguing that, 
pursuant to the passage of “stakeholder” statutes permitting corporate directors to consider interests of 
parties other than shareholders, corporations should be found to owe fiduciary duties to employees when 
fundamental corporate changes are made); accord Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stake-
holders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45 (1991). 
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specified in the articles of incorporation of any business,148 or by legislative 
action.149
Explicit mention of the nexus of contracts theory is rarely found in ju-
dicial decisions. Indeed, Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit is a lead-
ing proponent of the nexus of contracts theory, and he has only used the 
phrase in a decision once—in Central States, Southeast and Southwest Ar-
eas Pension Fund v. Sherwin-Williams Co.150 Even in that case, the use of 
the term was merely dicta, unnecessary to the court’s decision to uphold an 
arbitrator’s finding that a parent company had not become a new entity 
through the sale of a subsidiary.151
Another example of a court referring to this theory is to be found in 
Kidde Industries, Inc. v. United States.152  In that case, the Court of Federal 
Claims examined and quickly dismissed as irrelevant the contention raised 
by a corporation seeking a tax reduction, based on the theory that it was not 
the entity, but rather the shareholders who bore the risk of a certain transac-
tion: 
[T]hat modern economic theory views a corporation as a nexus of 
contracts among individual stakeholders and evaluates corporate deci-
sions based on how the individual stakeholders are affected. Consis-
tent with this approach . . . [the expert put forward by the defense] ar-
gued that corporations do not bear risk but rather individual stake-
holders bear risk. Hence, defendant argues, in determining whether 
risk shifting or risk distributing occurred herein, the court should fo-
cus on the individual shareholders . . . and the risk faced by these 
shareholders is not affected when one subsidiary assumes legal re-
sponsibility for the claims against the other subsidiaries.153
While conceding that this argument “to the extent it presents a purely eco-
nomic analysis, is straightforward and makes eminent sense,” the court 
nonetheless concluded that “the tax laws do not view corporate actions 
from the perspective of the corporate shareholders and do not treat corpora-
148
 It would be unusual for a corporate charter to give shareholders rights against managers beyond 
those already required by the laws of the state of incorporation. 
149
 Much legislation does, however, recognize the existence of fiduciary duties, and many legisla-
tures have acted to modify duties established by the courts of their states. See, e.g., supra notes 74-79 
and accompanying text.  
150
 71 F.3d 1338 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that “[a] corporation is just a nexus of contracts, subject to 
rearrangement in many ways”). Id. at 1341. 
151
 Id. at 1343 (stating: “There was, and is, only one ‘group’: the Sherwin-Williams group. No ‘old 
Sherwin-Williams group’ and no ‘new Sherwin-Williams group.’ Just one group comprising changing 
assortments of assets and operations”).  
152
 40 Fed. Cl. 42 (1997).  
153
 Id. at 55. 
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tions as fictitious entities that can be ignored.”154 Although this determina-
tion was not necessary for the decision rendered, the court clearly rejected 
the nexus of contracts theory as a basis for assessing the liabilities of a cor-
poration. 
Although no court has yet applied the nexus of contracts theory as a 
reason to oppose the practice of imposing fiduciary duties, this by no means 
makes this result impossible. Such a change in this area would appear to be 
highly unlikely in the near future, given the strength of the jurisprudence of 
fiduciary duties. Courts frequently take decades of prodding to undertake 
fundamental changes to certain areas of the law.155 Instances abound, how-
ever, of theories long-argued but little regarded suddenly sweeping across 
the nation to be established as the new majority approach of the courts,156 or 
enacted as state law.157
154
 Id.
155
 Application of the doctrine of implied warranty of the seller of defective products is one exam-
ple of an area where change occurred slowly, deliberately, and in incremental steps. See, e.g., Greenman 
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (Traynor, J.) (describing the incremental process 
by which courts moved away from the requirement of privity of contract in strict liability claims based 
on the warranty of quality made through advertising by the original manufacturer): 
Although . . . strict liability has usually been based on the theory of an express or implied warranty 
running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a contract 
between them, the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law, 
and the refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its own responsibility for defec-
tive products make clear that the liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but 
by the law of strict liability in tort. 
Id. at 901 (citations omitted); see also William Lloyd Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE 
L.J. 1099 (1960) (describing the evolution and growth of the implied warranty doctrine from 1913 to 
1960). 
156
 See, e.g., James W. Bozzomo, Joint Legal Custody: A Parent’s Constitutional Right In a Reor-
ganized Family, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 549 (2002) (discussing the swift abandonment of the “tender 
years” doctrine, under which courts had generally awarded custody of young children to the mother): 
The tender years philosophy dominated the courts' decision making up until the mid-1970s. Rec-
ognizing the constitutional nature of parental rights, the tender years doctrine was struck down by 
most courts as a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it 
discriminated against fathers. After this period, courts abandoned the tender years doctrine for 
gender-neutral rules and applied a best interests of the child test.  
157
 See, e.g., supra notes 79-80 and accompanying discussion of the swift spread of state statutes 
permitting corporations to limit the director’s duty of care; see also McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 
52 (Tenn. 1992) (judicially dispensing with contributory negligence and instead adopting comparative 
fault for the state of Tennessee, but discussing how a majority of states have made this change by stat-
ute): 
Between 1920 and 1969, a few states began utilizing the principles of comparative fault in all tort 
litigation. Then, between 1969 and 1984, comparative fault replaced contributory negligence in 37 
additional states. In 1991, South Carolina became the 45th state to adopt comparative fault, leaving 
Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, and Tennessee as the only remaining common law 
contributory negligence jurisdictions. Eleven states have judicially adopted comparative fault. 
Thirty-four states have legislatively adopted comparative fault. 
Id. at 55-56 (internal citations omitted). 
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
Throughout most of the history of the United States, business organiz-
ers essentially have had to choose between two business forms, the partner-
ship and the corporation.158 Each of these presents a specific set of advan-
tages (or, perhaps, avoids a specific set of disadvantages), and each has 
evolved a number of variations which are important in understanding the 
development of the LLC.159 A historical account of the development of the 
LLC itself appears far more mundane than its storied antecedents, but the 
LLC may yet have the most interesting tale to tell. 
A.  Business Organizations Preceding the LLC 
1.    The Partnership 
The partnership is basically the default business form—if two parties 
do nothing more than “carry on as co-owners a business for profit,” they 
have nevertheless become partners under the law, “whether or not the per-
sons intend to form a partnership.”160 The partnership is therefore unique 
158
 Larry E. Ribstein, LLCs: Is the Future Here?: A History and Prognosis, 13-DEC BUS. L.
TODAY 11, 12 (2003) [hereinafter, Ribstein, LLCs: Is the Future Here?]; see also Banoff, supra note 
105, at 54 (noting that until recently, parties have been limited to the partnership, the corporation, and 
the rarely-used limited partnership, but noting also that some flexibility was afforded by the availability 
of foreign incorporation). 
159
 The LLC, as will be shown, is often described as an effort to capture the benefits of the busi-
ness forms that preceded it, but because the language used in many LLC statutes copies language used 
in corporation and partnership statutes, the historical treatment of these other forms often guides courts 
in dealing with LLCs. See, e.g., Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 1998) (Posner, J) (deter-
mining that an LLC should be treated as a limited partnership for determining diversity jurisdiction). 
Judge Posner writes: 
Given the resemblance between an LLC and a limited partnership, and what seems to have crystal-
lized as a principle that members of associations are citizens for diversity purposes unless Con-
gress provides otherwise (as it has with respect to corporations, in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)), we 
conclude that the citizenship of an LLC for purposes of the diversity jurisdiction is the citizenship 
of its members. 
Id. at 731 (internal citations omitted); see also Koh v. Inno-Pacific Holdings, Ltd., 54 P.3d 1270, 1272 
(Wash. App. 2002) (referring to the Uniform Partnership Act and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act 
to interpret similar provisions in the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act); Kaycee Land and Live-
stock v. Flahive, 46 P.3d 323 (Wyo. 2002) (holding that “[n]o reason exists in law or equity for treating 
an LLC differently than a corporation is treated when considering whether to disregard the legal en-
tity”); Cimarron Feeders v. Bolle, 17 P.3d 957, 964 (Kan. App. 2d 2001) (holding that trial court com-
mitted reversible error, in part for instructing the jury to apply language regarding fiduciary duties in the 
state's partnership act to the relationships in a limited liability company). 
160
 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT 1997 § 202: Formation of Partnership: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), the association of two or more persons to carry 
on as co-owners a business for profit forms a partnership, whether or not the persons intend to 
form a partnership. 
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among business organizations in that it can be created inadvertently.161 Par-
ties opting to create a business of any other form must file the appropriate 
papers with the state.162 The partnership has traditionally afforded the great-
est flexibility in the organization of management, as the partners are free to 
assign management responsibilities to any party within or without the part-
nership, with no interference from the state.163 The only caveats to the op-
eration of this business form are that changes to the conduct of the partner-
ship “must be decided by a majority of the partners provided no other 
agreement between the partners speaks to the issue.”164 Partners have a fi-
(b) An association formed under a statute other than this [Act], a predecessor statute, or a compa-
rable statute of another jurisdiction is not a partnership under this [Act]. 
(c) In determining whether a partnership is formed, the following rules apply: 
(1) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entireties, joint property, common property, 
or part ownership does not by itself establish a partnership, even if the co-owners share profits 
made by the use of the property. 
(2) The sharing of gross returns does not by itself establish a partnership, even if the persons shar-
ing them have a joint or common right or interest in property from which the returns are derived. 
(3) A person who receives a share of the profits of a business is presumed to be a partner in the 
business, unless the profits were received in payment: 
(i) of a debt by installments or otherwise; 
(ii) for services as an independent contractor or of wages or other compensation to an employee; 
(iii) of rent; 
(iv) of an annuity or other retirement or health benefit to a beneficiary, representative, or designee 
of a deceased or retired partner; 
(v) of interest or other charge on a loan, even if the amount of payment varies with the profits of 
the business, including a direct or indirect present or future ownership of the collateral, or rights to 
income, proceeds, or increase in value derived from the collateral; or 
(vi) for the sale of the goodwill of a business or other property by installments or otherwise. 
161
 Numerous cases demonstrate the longstanding pedigree of this principle. See, e.g., Dubos v. 
Hoover, 6 So. 788 (Fla. 1889) (finding that where persons agreed “to place their money, labor, and skill, 
or some or all of them, in lawful commerce or business [in this case running a hotel and saloon], with 
the understanding that there shall be a communion of the profits thereof between them,” the parties 
thereby became partners in that business, and subject to the duties and strictures of that business form). 
It is for this reason that the partnership remains a necessary area of study in any business organizations 
course, despite the fact that partnership is in many respects the least attractive business form. 
162
 See, e.g., Ribstein, Limited Liability, supra note 1 (discussing the theory that the longstanding 
historical filing requirement for corporations support theories of the state’s role in the corporate form, 
and concluding that “in order to preserve their control of corporate terms states must constrain the 
parties’ ability to obtain limited liability without incorporating or making some other state filing”). Id. at 
91; see also MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 28, at 65 (noting that “a limited partnership is formed only 
by complying with statutory formalities similar to those required for the creation of a corporation”). 
163
 WILLIAM A. GREGORY & THOMAS R. HURST, UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 371 
(2d Edition 2002); (noting that “the corporation being a creature of statute, the parties have less freedom 
to vary their relationship among themselves or with third parties than in a partnership”). 
164
 Summers v. Dooley, 481 P.2d 318, 321 (1971) (holding that one partner in a garbage collection 
business could not be required to contribute to the salary of a person unilaterally hired by the other 
partner); Nat’l Biscuit Co., Inc. v. Stroud, 106 S.E.2d 692 (N.C. 1959) (holding that one of two partners 
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duciary relationship to one another with regards to matters affecting the 
partnership. The great disadvantages to a partnership are that the ownership 
interest is non-transferable, and that all partners have unlimited liability for 
debts arising from both the contracts and torts of the firm.165 The partner-
ship, therefore, bears the burdens of unlimited liability and lack of transfer-
ability, but avoids complexity, lack of control by the owner, and double-
taxation.166
2.    The Limited Partnership (LP) 
A variation of the partnership, the limited partnership (LP), was first 
created in the state of New York in 1822.167 Like other complex business 
forms, parties seeking to form a limited partnership must file the appropri-
ate papers with the state.168 Under this businesses form, general partners 
remain liable for the obligations of the firm, but limited partners are only 
in a grocery business could not unilaterally cease an ongoing business relationship with the partnership’s 
current supplier of bread). 
165
 See generally Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 discussed supra note 89 and accompanying 
text; see also Elizabeth M. McGeever, Hazardous Duty? The Role of the Fiduciary in Noncorporate 
Structures, 4-APR BUS. L. TODAY 51 (1995) (stating that “[t]he universally accepted norm that partners 
owe fiduciary duties among themselves and to the partnership stems from the early English system, 
where all mercantile matters including partnership cases were handled by equity courts.”); MARKHAM &
HAZEN, supra note 28, at 20. 
166
 See Richard M. Lipton, Acquiring or Selling the Privately Held Company, PRAC. LAW INST.
JUNE-JULY (2003) (stating that “[t]o avoid double taxation, a business owner may choose an entity 
which does not risk double taxation, namely, proprietorships, partnerships, limited partnerships, LLCs 
classified as partnerships, and, generally, S corporations.”) 
167
 Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1459, 
1502 (1998). Hamill explains this history as follows: 
In 1822, New York enacted the first limited partnership statute as an alternative to the business 
corporation. The New York statute envisioned two classes of partners: the general partners who 
were fully liable and limited partners who only had their capital contribution at risk. Over the fol-
lowing twenty-year period, most states enacted similar statutes as an attempt to slow the increased 
use of the business corporation. However, the early limited partnership statutes were seldom used. 
Id. at 1502 n.192; accord GREGORY & HURST, supra note 163, at 705; MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note
28, at 16-17, 65. 
168
 See, e.g,. UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT 2001 § 201, stating:  
(a) In order for a limited partnership to be formed, a certificate of limited partnership must be de-
livered to the [Secretary of State] for filing. The certificate must state: 
(1) the name of the limited partnership, which must comply with Section 108; 
(2) the street and mailing address of the initial designated office and the name and street and mail-
ing address of the initial agent for service of process; 
(3) the name and the street and mailing address of each general partner; 
(4) whether the limited partnership is a limited liability limited partnership; and 
(5) any additional information required by [Article] 11. 
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liable for the amount of their investment,169 so long as those partners do not 
take an active role in the management of the firm.170
An interesting twist to this model is the fact that the general partner 
may be a corporation.171 In theory and practice, it is possible for a limited 
partnership to be formed wherein the general partner is a corporation, and 
some or all of the limited partners are members of the board of directors of 
that corporation. Those limited partners may then freely participate in the 
management of the corporation, which is managing the partnership.172 In 
this way, the parties to this business may be able to avoid taxation, unlim-
ited liability, and the separation between ownership and control. As officers 
in the corporation, however, they will be burdened with the fiduciary duties 
to other shareholders in the corporation that typical limited partners might 
169
 GREGORY & HURST, supra note 163, at 4. 
170
 See, e.g., Gateway Potato Sales v. G.B. Inv. Co., 822 P.2d 490 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (finding 
that purported limited partner who exercised control over the activities of the partnership could be held 
liable as a general partner); see also GREGORY & HURST, supra note 163, at 4. 
171
 See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT 2001 § 201, stating: 
(8) "General partner" means: 
(A) with respect to a limited partnership, a person that: 
(i) becomes a general partner under Section 401; or 
(ii) was a general partner in a limited partnership when the limited partnership became subject to 
this [Act] under Section 1206(a) or (b); and 
(B) with respect to a foreign limited partnership, a person that has rights, powers, and obligations 
similar to those of a general partner in a limited partnership.  
. . . 
(14) "Person" means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited li-
ability company, association, joint venture, government; governmental subdivision, agency, or in-
strumentality; public corporation, or any other legal or commercial entity. 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 620.108(1) (West 1997) stating: 
(c) Each general partner that is a legal or commercial entity and not an individual must be organ-
ized or otherwise registered with the Department of State as required by law, must maintain an ac-
tive status, and must not be dissolved, revoked, or withdrawn. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit 6, § 17-101 (1997) stating: 
(5) "General partner" means a person who has been admitted to a limited partnership as a general 
partner in accordance with the partnership agreement and so named in the certificate of limited 
partnership or similar instrument under which the limited partnership is organized if so required.  
. . . 
(14) "Person" means a natural person, partnership (whether general or limited), limited liability 
company, trust, estate, association, corporation, custodian, nominee or any other individual or en-
tity in its own or any representative capacity, in each case, whether domestic or foreign. 
172
 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 620.129 (West 1997): 
(2) A limited partner does not participate in the control of the business within the meaning of sub-
section (1) solely by doing one or more of the following things: 
(a) Being a contractor for or an agent or employee of the limited partnership or of a general partner 
or being an officer, director, or shareholder of a general partner that is a corporation. 
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otherwise be able to avoid. Furthermore, courts may place upon persons 
holding such a dual role the burden of proving that their activities were 
solely conducted within the scope of their office in the corporation.173 Some 
courts have rejected this construction outright as an attempt to evade the 
strictures of the LP form.174 At least one recent case suggests, however, that 
members of the limited partnership itself can contract around the imposition 
of fiduciary duties.175
3.    The Corporation 
Addressing the corporation, Ribstein notes that “[f]irms long have had 
other ways of obtaining limited liability—most notably, by incorporat-
ing,”176 but goes on to point out the many deficiencies of the corporate 
form, including increased costs, and having to choose between entity taxa-
tion177 or accepting the limitations accompanying Subchapter S status.178
The corporation is, in many ways, the opposite of the partnership. Forma-
tion of a corporation allows parties to avoid unlimited liability for both 
owners and managers, but also requires them to accept strict limitations on 
the way the firm can be organized and managed,179 and to accept the impo-
173
 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Chalpin, 565 N.E. 2d 1253 (N.Y. 1990) (holding that a limited partner 
who was also president, sole shareholder and director of the corporate general partner was liable for 
debts of the partnership where said limited partner failed to prove that he acted as officer of general 
partner on behalf of partnership, and not individually, in incurring a debt upon the partnership).  
174
 See, e.g., Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 526 S.W. 2d 543 (Tex. 1975) (holding that “the per-
sonal liability, which attaches to a limited partner when 'he takes part in the control and management of 
the business,' cannot be evaded merely by acting through a corporation”). Id. at 545. 
175
 Sonet v. Timber Co., L.P., 722 A.2d 319 (Del. Ch. 1998) (holding that provisions of a limited 
partnership agreement vesting sole discretion in case of a merger in the general partner absolved said 
general partner of the fiduciary default rule, which would otherwise have required the general partner to 
be ‘fair and reasonable to the partnership’). 
176
 Larry E. Ribstein, The Emergence of the Limited Liability Company, 51 BUS. LAW. 1, 22 (1995) 
[hereinafter Ribstein, Emergence]. Professor Ribstein has become perhaps the foremost authority on the 
nature of the LLC, and has authored or co-authored no fewer than nine law review articles discussing 
the LLC. Professor Ribstein has also co-authored with Professor Robert R. Keatinge multiple editions of 
an extensive treatise on the topic, LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE 
ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES (1998). 
177
 Ribstein, Emergence, supra note 176, at 3 (explaining entity taxation as “taxation on income at 
the corporate level when it is earned and again at the shareholder level when it is distributed as divi-
dends”). 
178
 Id. at 2-3. Ribstein identifies the limitations placed on corporations seeking Subchapter S status 
as those “prohibiting more than thirty-five shareholders, restricting who may own stock, forbidding an 
allocation of dividend and liquidation rights that creates more than one ‘class’ of stock, and requiring 
shareholders to allocate income, loss, deduction, and credit in direct proportion to their interests in the 
corporation.” These limitations change from time to time, and since the time of Ribstein’s writing, the 
permissible number of shareholders has been raised to 75; see James F. McCrackin , Recent Changes to 
S Corporation Rules, 8-FEB S.C. LAW 32 (1997). 
179
 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2000) (requiring the corporation to have its business 
managed by a board of directors, setting the minimum quorum at 1/3 of the total number of directors, 
permitting the board of directors to be divided into no more than 3 classes, and placing conditions on the 
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sition of fiduciary duties running from officers to owners.180 The basic blue-
print of a corporation is a business entity where ownership is vested in 
shares of stock issued by the entity, while management is vested in a board 
of directors elected by the shareholders. 
Some variations of the corporate form are also possible by maintaining 
the corporation as a closely held firm, or as a Subchapter ‘S’ corporation, or 
both. Courts have adopted a definition of the close corporation as one that is 
“typified by: (1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no ready market for 
the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder participation in 
the management, direction and operations of the corporation.”181 As Profes-
sor Ribstein observes, “case and statutory law long have allowed closely 
held firms to adapt the corporate form to their distinct needs by adopting 
direct member-management, restricting transferability, and giving members 
a means of exit through buyout or dissolution.”182 Close corporations are 
really a category apart from publicly held corporations, as they afford addi-
tional benefits and may extract additional burdens in the form of heightened 
fiduciary duties to minority owners.183
A particular set of drawbacks is incumbent upon this business form: 
This approach, however, puts the burden on closely held firms to en-
gage in costly and detailed planning. Where planning is imperfect, as 
it so often is in closely held firms, the standard corporate default rules 
are ready to strike. Unwary minority members may be frozen into an 
economically inferior position. The cure for this may be worse than 
the disease—subjecting the firm to ad hoc judicial remedies that tend 
to ignore the deals the parties actually have made.184
power to remove directors); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2000) (requiring annual meetings of the 
stockholders and vesting in the court of chancery the power to compel such a meeting if one is not held 
within thirteen months); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 222 (2000) (requiring stockholder meetings be pre-
ceeded by written notice containing certain information and within a certain timeframe). 
180
 See supra note 78-107 and accompanying text for discussion of the fiduciary duties thus im-
posed. 
181
 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975). But see F. HODGE 
O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.02 (1996) 
(suggesting that the term “close corporation” should encompass any corporation “whose shares are not 
generally traded in the securities markets”). 
182
 Ribstein, Emergence, supra note 176, at 2. 
183
 MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 28, at 358-386. Interestingly, the authors note at the end of 
this section that “[t]he fiduciary obligations in Donahue and Meiselman [both cases establishing height-
ened fiduciary duties owed by majority owners to minority owners in close corporations] are based on 
analogy to partnership law.” Id. at 387; see Donahue, supra note 179; Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 
S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983). The authors then ask, “What basis, if any, is there for finding a different stan-
dard of conduct applicable to dealings between members in limited liability companies?” MARKHAM &
HAZEN, supra note 28, at 387.  
184
 Ribstein, Emergence, supra note 176, at 2-3. 
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The possibility exists that a minority shareholder in a close corporation may 
find herself in an untenable position, possessing stock which they cannot 
sell for lack of a market, but which affords her no control over the business, 
because of her minority position. The controlling shareholders (or their 
elected directors) may opt to continually reinvest profits and never pay 
dividends. Courts have sought to remedy this by creating heightened fiduci-
ary duties for majority shareholders in close corporations—the “cure that 
may be worse than the disease” to which Ribstein refers above. Further-
more, most states that provide special rules for close corporations require 
the business to register in this form with the state.185
It is important to note that the close corporation and the “Subchapter 
S” corporation are not identical, although they are related concepts in that 
both entail legislative efforts to relieve smaller companies of the burdens 
associated with incorporation. Corporations that fall into one of these cate-
gories are certainly likely to overlap with the other. As Ribstein explains: 
Congress created the Subchapter S corporation, which permitted part-
nership-type taxation in the corporate form. Congress hoped this de-
vice would satisfy the craving for single-level taxation in the simplest 
corporations without inviting abuse. But this enforced simplicity 
makes Subchapter S a kind of straightjacket, limiting the number and 
type of members and, most important, confining firms to a single-class 
capital structure.186
Hence we have Subchapter S corporations which avoid double taxation and 
still manage to avoid unlimited liability, but at the price of staying relatively 
small and simple; and we have close corporations which have no special 
185
 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351 (2000): 
The certificate of incorporation of a close corporation may provide that the business of the corpora-
tion shall be managed by the stockholders of the corporation rather than by a board of directors. So long 
as this provision continues in effect: 
(1) No meeting of stockholders need be called to elect directors; 
(2) Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the stockholders of the corporation shall be 
deemed to be directors for purposes of applying provisions of this chapter; and 
(3) The stockholders of the corporation shall be subject to all liabilities of directors. 
Such a provision may be inserted in the certificate of incorporation by amendment if all incorpora-
tors and subscribers or all holders of record of all of the outstanding stock, whether or not having 
voting power, authorize such a provision. An amendment to the certificate of incorporation to de-
lete such a provision shall be adopted by a vote of the holders of a majority of all outstanding stock 
of the corporation, whether or not otherwise entitled to vote. If the certificate of incorporation con-
tains a provision authorized by this section, the existence of such provision shall be noted con-
spicuously on the face or back of every stock certificate issued by such corporation. 
186
 Ribstein, LLCs: Is the Future Here?, supra note 158, at 12. 
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taxation status187 but which avoid unlimited liability. As Ribstein notes 
above, may avoid a great deal of corporate complexity by opting to have 
direct member-management, where this is permitted.  
B.  The Birth of the LLC 
The first LLC statute, enacted in Wyoming in 1977, enabled parties 
seeking to participate in business for profit to pursue this desire under an 
entirely new kind of business organization: the limited liability company 
(LLC).188 Commentators tend to characterize the LLC as “a hybrid of the 
corporate and partnership forms.”189 The creation of the LLC was an effort 
to establish a business form that combined the benefits offered by the two 
most prominent existing business forms of the time.190 The Wyoming LLC 
187
 Close corporations may or may not avoid double taxation, depending on whether they qualify 
for Subchapter S status. The determination that a business is a ‘close’ corporation is entirely a matter of 
state law, but close corporations are more likely to fall within the restrictions placed on Subchapter S 
corporations. 
188
 WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-101 to -136 (1977) (titled the “Wyoming Limited Liability Com-
pany Act”). 
189
 Ribstein, Emergence , supra note 176, at 2. The purported hybrid nature of the LLC, or at least 
the desire for such a business form, has inspired some interesting attempts to create a new vocabulary of 
business organizations. Ribstein, for example, asserts that “we needed a business form that combined 
the most useful elements of both partnerships and corporations for closely held firms . . . the ‘partnera-
tion.’” Ribstein, LLCs: Is the Future Here?, supra note 158, at 11. Ribstein further notes that “general 
partners [in Limited Partnerships] could incorporate, thereby creating what has been called a corpner-
ship.’” Id. The LLC itself has been labeled a “lamb with mandibles of death.” J. William Callison & 
Allan W. Vestal, “They’ve Created a Lamb with Mandibles of Death”: Secrecy, Disclosure, and Fiduci-
ary Duties In Limited Liability Firms, 76 IND. L.J. 271, 279 (2001) [hereinafter Callison & Vestal]. But 
the most interesting word used to capture the nature of the LLC must be the one used by Daniel S. 
Kleinberger, Sorting Through the Soup: How do LLCs, LLPs and LLLPs Fit within the Regulations and 
Legal Doctrines?, 13-DEC BUS. L. TODAY 15 (2003): 
In a children's book published in 1946, Ben Ross Berenberg described an imaginary amalgam 
called the churkendoose—“part chicken, turkey, duck and goose.” In 1977, Wyoming invented a 
business law churkendoose: the limited liability company—part corporation, part general partner-
ship, part limited partnership. That churkendoose has revolutionized the law of business organiza-
tions . . . . 
Kleinberger also addresses the difficulties that some courts have had in properly using the terminology 
of this new business form: 
More than one court has referred to an LLC as “a limited liability corporation” or to LLC members 
as shareholders, and one case referred to an LLC's members as “limited liability partners.” In an-
other case the court had to determine which long-arm statute to apply to an entity described in the 
key contract as “United Restoration, LLC, A Florida Corporation.”  
Id.
190
 This is, at least, the conventional view of the purpose of the LLC. I argue, however, the subtle 
but important distinction that “it might be equally appropriate to characterize it as an entity that avoids 
the disadvantages of all other business forms,” because proponents of the modern LLC seek to use this 
form to avoid burdens that are imposed on all other business forms. See infra notes 281-286 and accom-
panying text. 
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statute provided “limited liability for all members,191 partnership features 
such as dissolution at will192 and lack of free transferability,193 and members’ 
ability to participate in control194 without risking loss of their limited liabil-
ity.”195
Professor Ribstein characterizes the Wyoming LLC legislation as a 
“little-noticed development that ultimately led to a new era in business 
forms.”196 Such legislation, however, essentially legitimated a business form 
that was already in use, as “it was not a large leap from the liability af-
forded by using limited partnerships with thinly-capitalized, single-purpose 
corporate general partners, allowed by incremental income tax law changes, 
to protection without the corporate intermediary.”197 Neither is the LLC a 
far cry from a close corporation that also qualifies for Subchapter S status, 
wherein either the members have opted to manage the business directly, or 
where all of the shareholders are on the board of directors, or are entitled to 
elect a representative to the board of directors.198 Indeed, in some states, if 
such a close corporation were the general partner in a limited partnership, 
the shareholders of the close corporation could directly manage the close 
corporation without even having the formality of a board of directors.199
191
 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-113 (1977), titled “Liability of members and managers,” stating: 
Neither the members of a limited liability company nor the managers of a limited liability com-
pany managed by a manager or managers are liable under a judgment, decree or order of a court, 
or in any other manner, for a debt, obligation or liability of the limited liability company. 
192
 WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-124 to -126 and -128 (1977), respectively titled “Filing of state-
ment of intent to dissolve”; “Effect of filing of dissolving statement”; “Distribution of assets upon 
dissolution”; and “Filing of articles of dissolution”; these statutes collectively permit the LLC to dis-
solve upon the delivery of the appropriate paperwork to the secretary of state. It should be noted, how-
ever, that corporations also enjoy the ability to dissolve if this is the desire of the owners. 
193
 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-122 (1977), titled “Interest in company; transferability of interest,” 
stating: 
[I]f all of the other members of the limited liability company other than the member proposing to 
dispose of his or its interest do not approve of the proposed transfer or assignment by unanimous 
written consent, the transferee of the member’s interest shall have no right to participate in the 
management of the business and affairs of the limited liability company or to become a member. 
194
 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-107(ix) (1977), titled “Articles of organization” and laying out 
simple procedures by which business organizers are permitted to indicate whether the limited liability 
company “is to be managed by a manager or managers,” or whether “the management of a limited 
liability company is reserved to the members.” 
195
 Ribstein, LLCs: Is the Future Here?, supra note 158, at 11. 
196
 Id.
197
 J. William Callison, Rationalizing Limited Liability and Veil Piercing, 58 BUS. LAW. 1063, 
1064 (2003). 
198
 Such an arrangement, however, does raise the danger that courts may assess heightened fiduci-
ary duties towards majority shareholders towards minority shareholders. See supra notes 148-152 and 
accompanying text. 
199
 See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 620 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1982) (permitting shareholders 
to vote by unanimous agreement to manage the corporation by directly voting their shares, bypassing the 
very existence of a board of directors). 
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They might thereby be able to avoid both unlimited liability and double 
taxation. Furthermore, being only limited partners in the partnership them-
selves, they could arguably claim that they owed no fiduciary duties to any 
other limited partners who were not also shareholders in the corporate gen-
eral partner. Of course, accomplishing all of this through a single business 
form would save participants much time and effort.200
Returning to the Wyoming statute, some commentators suggest that 
the LLC was inspired by business organizations prevalent in other coun-
tries. The Prefatory Notes to the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
(“ULLCA”) support that contention, asserting that Wyoming arrived at this 
statute by “[b]orrowing from abroad.”201 Some point to business forms em-
ployed in England, France, and Latin America,202 while others suggest that 
the LLC “[a]ppears to be modeled after the German GmbH that was estab-
lished in 1892 for small German enterprises.”203 The Florida LLC statute, 
enacted in 1982,204 may also have borrowed from abroad, apparently having 
been crafted with the belief that “similarities between the Florida LLC and 
the South American limitada would provide a familiar investment vehicle 
[to South Americans] and attract a deluge of foreign capital into the 
state.”205 Others commentators have theorized that the development of the 
LLC was simply the inevitable product of an evolutionary process in busi-
ness organizations.206
Irrespective of its origin, the statute passed in Wyoming was “missing 
some critical elements such as detailed rules regarding fiduciary duties and 
the agency powers of members and managers.”207 Thus the LLC “was not 
truly born . . . until 1988 when it was ‘spanked’208 by Revenue Ruling 88-76 
200
 See James W. Lovely, Agency Costs, Liquidity, and the Limited Liability Company as an Alter-
native to the Close Corporation, 21 STETSON L. REV. 377 (1992) (urging the LLC as an alternative to 
the close corporation precisely because of the reduction in agency costs). 
201
 UNIF. LTD. LIABILITY CO. ACT, Prefatory Note, at i (2003). 
202 Lovely, supra note 200, at 81-83 (asserting that “Although the LLC is a very new organiza-
tional form in American law, it has an extensive history in both England and civil law countries” and 
discussing the history of purported predecessor business forms in England, France, and South America); 
cf. Terry A. O’Neill, Toward a New Theory of the Closely- Held Firm, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 603 
(1993) stating that “[l]imited liability companies have long existed in Europe and Latin America . . .”). 
203
 MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 28, at 17. 
204
 Ribstein, LLCs: Is the Future Here?, supra note 158, at 12. 
205
 Lovely, supra note 200, at 383. The author goes on to note that this effort was apparently not 
successful. Florida rewrote its Limited Liability Company Act in 1998. 
206
 See, e.g., Thomas Earl Geu, Chaos, Complexity, and CoEvolution: The Web of Law, Manage-
ment Theory, and Law Related Services at the Millennium, 66 TENN. L. REV. 137 (1998) (comparing the 
development of new business organizations to the evolution of living organisms). 
207
 Ribstein, Emergence, supra note 176, at 4. 
208
 Ribstein uses the analogy of the LLC being “spanked,” to indicate that the birth is now com-
plete. See Ribstein, Emergence, supra note 176, at 3. That is more aptly characterized as an event that is 
inherent in the process of the birth itself. I prefer to use the analogy of the briss, because this event is 
symbolic, and intended to show a true transformation in the baby. In the Jewish tradition, a child who 
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[wherein] the IRS classified a Wyoming LLC as a partnership for tax pur-
poses.”209 The importance of this classification can not be understated: 
By 1988, eleven years after the enactment of the Wyoming statute, 
only one other state (Florida) had enacted an LLC statute and there 
were only twenty-six LLCs in Wyoming. By the end of 1994, forty-six 
additional statutes had been passed and tens of thousands of LLCs had 
been formed.210
Professor Ribstein asserts that “[t]he explosion of LLC law in the few 
years since 1988 confirms not only the importance of the tax endorsement, 
but also the existence of a strong pent-up demand for this form of busi-
ness.”
211
 Tax considerations appear to have been a key consideration in 
states’ construction of their LLC statutes:  
LLC statutory default rules have always been designed to help ensure 
that LLCs formed under the statute will be classified as partnerships 
for tax purposes. A business is taxed as a partnership under Subchapter 
K of the Internal Revenue Code if it is not a “corporation,” which the 
Code defines to include “association.” The rules for the types of firms 
that are “associations” for tax purposes . . . provide that a business or-
ganization is a corporation and not a partnership if it has at least three 
of the following characteristics: continuity of life, centralized man-
agement, limited liability, and free transferability of interests. In order 
to help ensure that LLCs will be classified as partnerships for tax pur-
poses, LLC statutes include default rules requiring that members con-
sent to the transfer of management rights and that the firm dissolves 
upon the dissociation of a member.212
Federal income tax considerations may no longer be a factor in future revi-
sions of LLC statutes.213 At this juncture, however, the plethora of business 
died before his briss was essentially never born—a throwback to the days of high infant mortality 
among newborns. 
209
 Ribstein, Emergence, supra note 176, at 3. 
210
 Id.
211
 Id. at 4. 
212
 Id. at 5. 
213
 LLCs may also be assessed an income tax by the state in which they were created, although 
treatment for this purpose varies. Some states treat the LLC as a partnership in assessing state income 
tax.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.471 (West 2000). Other states treat the LLC as a corporation for 
this purpose.  See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8925(a) (West 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 208.31 
(West 1996). Texas assesses a “franchise tax” on the LLC, TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.001(a)(2) 
(Vernon 1992). See also Norton L. Steuben, Choice of Entity for Real Estate After Check-the-Box and 
the Entity Explosion, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 53 (2002): 
Although the classification of the LLC for federal income tax purposes is straightforward under 
the check-the-box system, it may be unclear as a matter of state tax law or regulation. Not all states 
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organizations has caused the IRS to throw its hands up in defeat and allow 
businesses organized in a form other than a corporation to choose how they 
wish to be classified for tax purposes.214
The popularity of the LLC prompted the creation of a Uniform Lim-
ited Liability Company Act, meant to guide states in the appropriate design 
of LLC statutes, which “was approved by the National Conference on 
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws in 1995.”215 This Uniform Act, how-
ever, has not proven to be as popular as the business form that inspired its 
creation. It has only been adopted in nine jurisdictions,216 and has been sub-
jected to some sharp criticism by commentators.217
have adopted the check-the-box system. As a result, a disregarded LLC might be treated as a cor-
poration for state tax purposes. 
Id. at 59. 
214
 See, e.g., Byron F. Egan, Choice of Entity Alternatives, 39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 379 (2004): 
On December 18, 1996, the IRS issued Treasury Regulations Sections 301.7701-1, -2, and -3 (the 
Check-the-Box Regulations), which became effective January 1, 1997 and completely replaced the 
former classification regulations (discussed hereinafter). Entities will now have the assurance of 
either partnership or corporate classification under a set of default rules or the ability to make an 
election to obtain the desired classification. 
Id. at 402. Note, however, that “the IRS still requires certain prerequisites to be fulfilled prior to qualify-
ing under the default rules or making a valid election.” Id; see 26 C. F. R. § 301.7701-3(a) (2003) (stat-
ing “[a] business entity that is not classified as a corporation under § 301.7701-2(b)(1), (3), (4), (5), (6), 
(7), or (8) (an eligible entity) can elect its classification for federal tax purposes as provided in this 
section.). 
215
 Claire Moore Dickerson, Equilibrium Destabilized: Fiduciary Duties Under the Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act, 25 STETSON L. REV. 417 (1995) [hereinafter Dickerson, Equilibrium 
Destabilized].  
216
 UNIF. LTD. LIABILITY CO. ACT, Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted, (2003). 
The jurisdictions are Alabama, Hawaii, Illinois, Montana, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, West 
Virginia, and the Virgin Islands. Interestingly, Hawaii and Vermont were the last two states to adopt an 
LLC statute at all, and did not choose to do so until the ULLCA was completed. They were therefore 
among the first states to adopt the ULLCA, as other states had to decide whether to change their existing 
laws to conform with the provisions of the proposed Uniform Act. 
217
 See, e.g., Dickerson, Equilibrium Destabilized, supra note 215: 
ULLCA is unsatisfactory in at least two ways. First, it is not supported by a clear understanding of 
why the LLC is considered a hybrid of the partnership and corporate forms. Second, it does not re-
flect a full analysis of the standards of performance currently applied to owners of a partnership 
versus those of a close corporation.  
Id. at 421. Dickerson goes on to criticize ULLCA for going too far in eliminating fiduciary duties for 
members who are not designated as managers. Accord Callison & Vestal, supra note 189, at 275-80. 
Perhaps the most thorough ULLCA rebuke can be found in Larry E. Ribstein, A Critique of the Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act, 25 STETSON L. REV. 311 (1995) [hereinafter Ribstein, Critique]: 
ULLCA makes many poor policy choices, including terms that are unsuited for informal firms, 
unnecessary mandatory rules, and rules that are inappropriately borrowed from other business 
forms. The drafting is often convoluted, complex and otherwise inept. . . . Among ULLCA's more 
serious problems are the following: (1) Unclear definition of operating agreement; (2) excessive 
and unclear restrictions on the extent to which the operating agreement can waive the provisions of 
the act; (3) unclear provisions on the effect of the articles of organization; (4) unduly broad agency 
power to transfer real property; (5) questionable provision for contracting for personal liability; (6) 
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In any event, this business form has enjoyed growing popularity, par-
ticularly in the last decade, not only among legislators, but among business 
founders as well.218 The LLC has become such an extraordinarily popular 
business form that “LLCs are gradually replacing corporations and limited 
partnerships as the leading business entity.”219 As has previously been noted, 
this popularity was spurred by the 1988 decision of the IRS that LLCs were 
to be taxed in the same way as partnership,220 and it is now possible to cre-
ate an LLC in all 50 states.221 Like the nexus of contracts theory, LLCs have 
also become a frequent topic of law review articles,222 and have even be-
unnecessary and perverse creditor-protection restrictions on distributions and compromise of con-
tribution obligations; (7) questionable default veto power of members even in manager-managed 
firms; (8) unwieldy default duties to provide information to members; (9) confusing and overbroad 
fiduciary duties; (10) overbroad grounds for judicial dissolution; (11) confusion concerning effect 
of providing for a term; (12) wholly unworkable provisions on dissolution; and (13) unnecessary 
and perverse derivative remedy. 
Id. at 387. 
218
 Ribstein, LLCs: Is the Future Here?, supra note 158, at 12. 
219
 Id. (based on the author’s examination of IRS filings from 2000-2002). 
220
 Id.
221
 Ribstein, LLCs is the Future Here?, supra note 158, at 12 (noting that “[b]y 1996, every U.S. 
jurisdiction had an LLC statute”). Accord GREGORY & HURST, supra note 163, at 809 (“By the end of 
1996 all of the fifty states had adopted LLC statutes.”). The statutes for the fifty states and Washington 
D.C. are ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-1 to -61 (1993); ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.50.010-.995 (Michie. 1994); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-601 to -857 (West 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-32-101 to -1316 (Michie 1993); 
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17000-17705 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-80-101 to -1101 (West 
1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-100 to -242 (West 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -
1107 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-1301 to -1375 (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.401-.514 (West 
1993); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14- 11-100 to -1109 (1995); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 428-101 to -1302 
(Michie 1996); IDAHO CODE §§ 53- 601 to -672 (Michie 1995); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-1 to 
60-1 (West 1995); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-18-1-1 to -13-1 (West 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 490A.100-
.1601 (West 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7601 to - 7652 (1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.001-
.455 (Michie 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1301-:1369 (West 1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 
156, §§ 1-69 (West 1995); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 4A-101 to - 1103 (1994); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 601-762 (West 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.4101-.5200 (West 1995); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 322B.01-.960 (West 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 79-29-101 to -1201 (1994); MO.
ANN. STAT. §§ 347.010-.187 (West 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-8-101 to -1307 (1994); Neb. Rev. 
Stat. §§ 21-2601 to -2653 (Supp. 1994); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 86.010-.571 (Michie 1994); N.H. REV.
STAT. §§ 304-C:1 -:85 ( 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:2B-1 to -70 (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-
19-1 to -74 (Michie 1994); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW §§ 101-1403 (McKinney 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 57C-1-01 to -10-07 (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-32-01 to - 155 (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
1705.01-.58 (West 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2000-2060 (West 1995); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
63.001-.990 (1994); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 8901-8998 (West 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7- 16-1 to -75 
(1994); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-43-101 to -1409 (Law. Co-op. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 47-34-1 to 
-59 (Michie 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-246- 101 to -602, 48-248-101 to -606 (1994); TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, §§ 1.01-11.07 (Vernon 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2b-101 to -158 
(1994); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1000 to -1123 (Michie 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3001-3162 
(1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 25.15.005-.902 (West 1995); W. VA. CODe §§ 31-1A-1 to -69 (Mi-
chie 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 183.0102-.1305 (West 1994); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-101 to -143 
(Michie 1995).  
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 Leigh A. Bacon, “Freedom Of” or “Freedom From”? The Enforceability of Contracts and the 
Integrity of the LLC, 50 DUKE L.J. 1087 (2001), stating: “The sudden growth of limited liability com-
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come a topic of their own law school textbooks and treatises.223 Indeed, no 
modern business organizations textbook would be complete without some 
discussion of both concepts.224
C. The Contractarian Nature of the Limited  
Liability Company 
1. Ability of Parties to Avoid Fiduciary Duties  
Through an LLC 
The LLC, from its very incipiency, has been an entity with features 
that clearly evoke the nexus of contracts. Indeed, the very “heart of the 
LLC”225 is a contract, the “operating agreement.”226 This is “a sort of consti-
pany (LLC) legislation in the past ten years has been accompanied by a corresponding amount of schol-
arship dedicated to the logistics, concerns, and implications of the limited liability company.” See, e.g.,
Banoff, supra note 105; Cohen, supra note 17; Dickerson, Equilibrium Destabilized, supra note 215; 
Hamill, supra note 167; Hyde, supra note 1; Joseph L. Lemon, Jr., Just How Limited Is That Liability?: 
The Enforceability of Indemnification, Advancement, and Fiduciary Duty Modification Provisions In LP, 
LLP, and LLC Agreements in Delaware Law, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 289 (2003); Kleinberger, supra
note 189; Lovely, supra note 200; Moore, supra note 87; Ribstein, LLCs: Is the Future Here?, supra
note 158; Ribstein, Emergence, supra note 176; Ribstein, Critique, supra note 215; Victor Peterson and 
Alison N. Zirn, Corporate Directors, LLCs, and Liability: It’s not Settled, but Caution is Advised, 12-
AUG BUS. L. TODAY 57 (2003). 
223
 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND LIMITED LIABILITY 
COMPANIES (2003); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN AND ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON 
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES (1998). 
224
 See, e.g., MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 498-
518 (8th ed. 2000) [hereinafter EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS] (discussing the limited liability company); 
CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ASSOCIATIONS 62-63 (3d ed. 1999); MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 28 (discussing the nexus of con-
tracts theory at 14-15, and the advent and properties of limited liability company at 17, 21, and 78-89); 
see also Larry Ribstein, Corporations or Business Associations? The Wisdom and Folly of an Integrated 
Course, 34 GA. L. REV. 973 (2000). Ribstein argues: 
[F]or the vast majority of our students the practice of business law will focus on closely held firms. 
Moreover, as we move into the twenty-first century, that practice will concern mainly unincorpo-
rated business forms, including partnerships, limited liability partnerships (LLPs), and limited li-
ability companies (LLCs). …it follows that only a fool would focus on corporations in the basic 
business course. 
Id. Ribstein concedes that he will nevertheless continue to focus on corporations in his own basic busi-
ness course, and concludes that law schools should offer an elective in unincorporated firms. Id. at 973, 
994. 
225
 Edward W. Feldman, Essential Elements of an Operating Agreement For a Law Firm Organ-
ized as an LLC, 16-APR CBA REC. 30 (2002); accord Lonnie Beard, The Small Business Entity Pass 
Through Act—The Birth of a Duck, 1993 ARK. L. NOTES 15, 17 (1993). 
226
 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-104(x) (Michie 1995): 
(a) Each limited liability company organized and existing under this act may: 
. . . 
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tution for the entity that allows the owners . . . with limited exceptions, to 
define their relations with each other and with third parties and to prescribe 
rules for operation and management of the entity.”227 The close proximity 
between the development of that theory and the creation of the LLC raises 
the temptation to suggest that there may have some direct connection be-
tween them. It is not so hard to imagine that, among all the state legislators 
in Wyoming in 1977, perhaps there was an economist or a business law-
yer—the kind of person who might read Jensen and Meckling’s article in 
the Journal of Financial Economics and take from it the inspiration to pro-
pose a new kind of business that would exactly fit the theory found therein. 
There is absolutely no evidence of such a connection, however, and the 
more likely possibility is that both the article and the new business form 
were simply coincidental responses to the common business and economic 
conditions of the time. 
Many legal scholars have examined the ability of the LLC members to 
modify or waive the fiduciary duties of the LLC’s managers.228 Some have 
either implicitly suggested that the LLC is a nexus of contracts, 229 or explic-
itly argued that the LLC should be treated as one.230 The LLC has succeeded 
in avoiding the unlimited liability of a partnership while also avoiding the 
choice between the structural rigidity and double taxation of a corporation 
(x) Make and alter operating agreements, not inconsistent with its articles of organization or with 
the laws of this state, for the administration and regulation of the affairs of the limited liability 
company. 
Various additional sections of the Wyoming statute permit or require that a wide variety of details 
be laid out in the operating agreement, such as management structure, relations between managers and 
other members, and division and allocation of profits. See also FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.402(24) (West 
1993) (defining the operating agreement as “written or oral provisions that are adopted for the manage-
ment and regulation of the affairs of the limited liability company and that set forth the relationships of 
the members, managers, or managing members and the limited liability company”).  
227
 Feldman, supra note 225, at 30. The operating agreement can be a quite lengthy document. One 
unreported case, Niki Development Corp. v. HOB Hotel Chicago Partners, L.P., 2003 WL 1712563 
(N.D. Ill. 2003) refers to an operating agreement that was apparently 99 pages long, based on the court's 
reference to the presentation of that page of the document as evidence that the document had been 
signed by the parties. 
228
 See, e.g., Callison & Vestal, supra note 188 (examining the provisions afforded in various 
states and under the ULLCA by which waiver of fiduciary duties by members of an LLC is permitted or 
prohibited); Dickerson, Equilibrium Destabilized, supra note 215 (criticizing provisions within the 
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act that permitting LLC members to set varied levels of fiduciary 
duties); Moore, supra note 87 (criticizing the decision of the Ohio Court of Appeals for permitting 
members of an LLC to waive fiduciary duties); see also Peterson, supra note 222 (examining the possi-
bility that directors of a corporation that manages an LLC may yet have fiduciary duties to LLC mem-
bers, even where members have waived fiduciary duties with respect to the LLC itself). 
229
 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 17. Cohen asserts that “The LLC in many ways represents the 
latest and perhaps most audacious attempt by contractarians to remove from commerce the ‘shackles’ of 
the state,” Id. at 433, and examines various questions raised by the existence of the LLC, including the 
possibility that the LLC should be treated as a contract among all parties involved. Id. at 486-490. 
230
 See, e.g., Ribstein, Emergence, supra note 176. 
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and the far greater structural rigidity of the Subchapter S corporation. A 
feature common to LLC statutes that is even more important to this analysis 
is the fact that every state now recognizes foreign LLCs.231 As the Prefatory 
Notes to the ULLCA indicate, “state limited liability company acts display 
a dazzling array of diversity.”232 Some states permit every aspect of the 
LLC’s existence and operation—including such particulars as fiduciary 
duties to investors—to be reduced to contractual language in an operating 
agreement: 
The most controversial aspect of fiduciary duties in the LLC context is 
that many statutes grant members the power to waive fiduciary duties 
in their entirety. Some statutes, such as New Jersey’s, have no express 
fiduciary standards but grant express authorization for contractual 
modifications of judge-made fiduciary doctrines. Other state statutes 
have fiduciary standards proscribed as default provisions, allowing 
avoidance of those standards only if the avoidance is contracted for in 
the original LLC agreement.233
As one commentator notes, “LLCs are creatures of statute. Consequently, to 
the extent that the statutes describe the extent of fiduciary duties, they con-
trol.”234 The statutes are themselves both widely varied and very flexible. 
ULLCA, for example “does describe fiduciary duty, but permits the parties 
to define it further, subject to a mandatory threshold of good faith.”235 How-
ever, only a handful of states have adopted the ULLCA. By contrast, “[t]he 
forty-one states which have adopted non-ULLCA-based LLC statutes deal 
with the fiduciary duties of participants in a wide variety of ways.”236 A 
number of states provide no language supporting a requirement of fiduciary 
duties, despite having “statutory provisions governing the fiduciary duties 
of partners in general partnerships, general partners in limited partnerships, 
and directors and officers in corporations.”237 The authors of the ULLCA 
231
 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-901 – 18.902; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.4082(1); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 17-15-132. 
232
 UNIF. LTD. LIABILITY CO. ACT, Prefatory Note, at i (2003). 
233
 Cohen, supra note 17, at 461. The author goes on to note that “a number of states do not ex-
pressly mention the issue of fiduciary duties in their statutes,” leaving the issue open for contractatrians 
and non-contractarians to argue over, and for courts to ultimately decide. 
234
 Dickerson, Equilibrium Destabilized, supra note 215, at 420-21. This sentiment has been 
echoed by a number of courts. See, e.g., Halley v. Barnabe, 24 P.3d 140, 145 (Kan. 2001) ("Limited 
liability companies became creatures of the Kansas statutes commencing with the enactment of the 
Kansas Limited Liability Company Act"); Alexander v. Minton, 855 So.2d 94, 97 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 
2003) (noting that LLC's “are wholly creatures of statute”). 
235
 Id. at 421. 
236
 Callison & Vestal, supra note 189, at 281. 
237
 Id. at 281. According to the authors, “[t]he Arizona, Kansas, Maryland, Nebraska, New Mex-
ico, Nevada, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming LLC acts make no reference to member or manager fiduciary 
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itself remark that “this lack of uniformity manifests itself in basic but fun-
damentally important questions, such as: what are the fiduciary duties of 
owners and managers to a company and each other . . . and are any or all of 
these and other rules simply default rules that may be modified by agree-
ment or are they nonwaivable.”238
As Ribstein predicted: 
[P]articularly given the blurred distinctions between members and 
managers in LLCs, statutes cannot completely define members’ and 
managers’ duties. Courts will have to fill in the blanks left by statutes 
and agreements, having due regard for the unique attributes of LLCs 
as distinguished from other types of business associations.239
To this end, it appears that many courts are, thus far, willing to uphold 
waivers of fiduciary duties.  
In Lynch Multimedia Corp. v. Carson Communications., LLC,240 the 
District of Kansas granted summary judgment against a claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty. In that case, Lynch and Carson were both members of a joint 
venture LLC called CLR Video, which was in the cable television busi-
ness.
241
 The operating agreement for the LLC contained two provisions at 
issue, one of which required members who became aware of an opportunity 
to attain another cable television business to “offer” it to the company;242
the other of which expressly permitted members to “engage independently 
or with others in other business ventures of every nature and description.”243
When Carson did eventually come across opportunities to attain some other 
cable television businesses, he informed Lynch about it.244 When Lynch did 
not respond conclusively, Carson pursued them on his own.245 Lynch sued, 
and the District Court found summary judgment in favor of Carson,246 con-
cluding that “[u]nder Kansas law, the members of a limited liability com-
pany may expand or restrict their duties and liabilities by the terms of their 
agreement.”247 The court determined that Carson had discharged his respon-
sibility to make the offer when Carson told Lynch about the opportunity; 
duties. These states therefore leave the duty question to the operating agreement or to judicial common-
law development.” Id. at n.49. 
238
 UNIF. LTD. LIABILITY CO. ACT, Prefatory Note, at i (2003). 
239
 Ribstein, Emergence, supra note 176, at 21; but see Kleinberger, supra note 189 at 17 (assert-
ing that “the LLC does not create gaps in judge-made law; it merely provides opportunities for judges to 
rearticulate established public policies in the light of new circumstances”). 
240
 102 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (D. Kan. 2000). 
241
 Id. at 1262. 
242
 Id.
243
 Id. at 1263. 
244
 Id.
245
 Id.
246
 Id. at 1265. 
247
 Id.
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and that Carson was then free to pursue the opportunity pursuant to the sec-
tion of the operating agreement that permitted members to engage in their 
own business ventures. Such a conclusion could not have been reached if 
this business was either a corporation or a partnership, for in either of those 
cases, Carson would have been a fiduciary, bound by a non-waivable duty 
not to compete.248
In a similar case, McConnell v. Hunt Sports Enterprises,249 “the appel-
late court for the Tenth District of Ohio joined the state of Delaware and 
other states when it found that members of a limited liability company 
(LLC) could choose to opt-out of their common law or statutory fiduciary 
duties to one another.”250 In this intriguing set of facts, a group of individu-
als formed an LLC called the Columbus Hockey League (CHL) for the pur-
pose of acquiring an NHL team.251 When LLC member McConnell suc-
ceeded in acquiring an NHL franchise, litigation commenced.252 Ultimately, 
the trial court directed a verdict in favor of McConnell, and “[t]he appellate 
court upheld the trial court’s decision and found that ‘an operating agree-
ment of a limited liability company may, in essence, limit or define the 
scope of the fiduciary duties imposed upon its members.’”253
In McGee v. Best,254 a state appellate court in Tennessee went so far as 
to deny the existence of fiduciary duties for an LLC created in that state. 
When a member of such an entity alleged that his firing constituted a 
breach of fiduciary duty, the court upheld the finding of the trial court that: 
[T]he Tennessee Limited Liability Corporation Act . . . does not create 
a fiduciary duty between members of an LLC. An LLC is a creature of 
statute, and any duty which members owe must be set forth in the 
statute. However, the Tennessee LLC Act does not create a fiduciary 
duty between members of an LLC. Therefore, Plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion based upon a fiduciary obligation owing to him individually does 
not state a cause of action recognized under the Tennessee LLC Act.255
Not all states have taken so permissive an approach. In New York—the 
birthplace of Justice Cardozo’s exacting standard from Meinhard v. 
248
 See supra note 78-107 and accompanying text for discussion of fiduciary duties. 
249
 725 N.E.2d 1193 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999). 
250
 Moore, supra note 87, at 184. 
251
 Id. at 197. 
252
 Presumably the Columbus Blue Jackets, which, at the time of this writing, is a sub-par profes-
sional hockey team, ranked 14th out of the 15 teams in the National Hockey League’s Western Confer-
ence. ESPN NHL 2003-2004 Standings, http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/standings?group=conference& 
column=playoffs (last visited Friday, April 15, 2004). 
253
 Moore, supra note 87, at 199. 
254
 106 S.W.3d 48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). 
255
 Id. at 57. 
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Salmon256—one court recently ruled that LLC members must be held to the 
same exacting standards as any other cooperative business venture. In Salm
v. Feldstein,257 the parties were members and co-managers of a Honda Deal-
ership organized as an LLC. The plaintiff alleged a breach of fiduciary duty 
based on the failure of the defendant to notify the plaintiff of a third party’s 
offer to purchase the enterprise.258 The defendant countered that “fiduciary 
duty does not lie between partners or managers in a limited liability com-
pany.”259 The court agreed that “the Limited Liability Company Law gives 
broad discretion to the parties to shape their operating agreement,”260 and 
noted that this statute had “no provision which explicitly imposes or ne-
gates a fiduciary duty.”261 Nevertheless, the court determined that the rela-
tive position of the parties demanded the imposition of fiduciary duties: 
[T]he law does provide that a “manager shall perform his or her duties 
as a manager . . . in good faith and with the degree of care that an or-
dinary prudent person in a like position would use under similar cir-
cumstances . . . ” In addition, partners in joint ventures, however con-
stituted, owe one another a fiduciary duty of loyalty. The duty includes 
an obligation not to favor one's own interests over those of the joint 
venture, to unfairly manipulate or control corporate processes to retain 
control or to appropriate for oneself an opportunity that belongs to the 
joint venture. A partner has a fiduciary obligation to other partners in 
the organization and owes a duty of individual and undiluted loyalty to 
those whose interests the fiduciary is to protect.262
The ultimate end of these variations is that the formation of LLCs, much 
like the formation of corporations, will gravitate towards those states that 
offer the terms perceived to be most favorable to the parties responsible for 
this formation. Delaware appears intent to maintain its claim as the leading 
location for the formation of new businesses. Cohen notes that “Delaware 
represents the boldest and most powerful push toward a private contractual-
ist model of the firm.”263 Indeed, in Elf Atochem Inc. v. Jaffari,264 the Dela-
ware Supreme Court stated that “only where the agreement is inconsistent 
256
 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
257
 No. 11940-03 (N.Y. App. Div. Aug. 20, 2004). 
258
 Id. at 4. 
259
 Id.
260
 Id.
261
 Id.
262
 Id. (emphasis added). The court nevertheless upheld the dismissal of the cause of action for 
lack of evidence to show that the alleged firm offer had, in fact, been made. 
263
 Cohen, supra note 17, at 472. 
264
 727 A.2d 286 (Del. 1999) (holding that an LLC was bound by its operating agreement against 
at attempted derivative suit, despite the fact that the LLC did not yet exist when the agreement was 
executed). 
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with mandatory statutory provisions will the members’ agreement be in-
validated.”265 This is a fairly strong statement, given that “[t]he Delaware 
statute has perhaps the greatest emphasis on the freedom to contract around 
fiduciary duties; this statute explicitly warns the courts not to void these 
contracts.”266
While it is true that the LLC might more appropriately be categorized 
as a nexus of contracts, based on the exceptional flexibility available to 
parties to the formation of such a business, it would be a very weak argu-
ment to suggest that the LLC was devised by state legislatures with the in-
tent of creating a truly contractarian business form. Professor Ribstein as-
serts that “the original Wyoming statute was hardly more than a cut-and-
paste from Wyoming’s limited partnership and corporation statutes with a 
smattering of provisions from Wyoming’s general partnership statute.”267 He 
further asserts that “[t]he growth of LLC statutes has been spurred largely 
by state bar committees rather than by independent legislative initiatives.”268
Others make a compelling case that the predominant “theory” motivating 
state legislatures in enacting LLC statutes was the theory that they would 
thereby attract business to their respective states. They explicitly assert that 
“it would be a mistake to treat the popularity of the LLC form as evidence 
that an underlying theory of the LLC has been well articulated or generally 
accepted.”269 At least one commentator, however, continues to argue “that 
the LLC’s popularity stems merely from its tax status and that the whole 
purpose of the LLC is to avoid taxes.”270
D.   Transferability of Business Forms and Recognition  
  of Foreign LLCs 
Although the ULLCA contemplates the possibility of businesses shift-
ing from one form to another, it only addresses the potential conversion of 
partnership or limited partnership to a limited liability company.271 Ribstein 
comments that “[s]everal LLC statutes also provide for conversions of gen-
eral and limited partnerships to LLCs.”272 Another way that an existing 
265
 Id. at 288. 
266
 Cohen, supra note 17, at 461; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-306 (1993) (the LLC oper-
ating agreement may provide for penalties or consequences for members upon nonfeasance or other 
events specified therein); id. § 18-405 (same provision with regard to managers). 
267
 Ribstein, Emergence, supra note 176, at 4. 
268
 Id. at 34. 
269
 Callison & Vestal, supra note 189, at 275. 
270
 Cohen, supra note 17, at 449. 
271
 UNIF. LTD. LIABILITY CO. ACT § 902-03 (2003). 
272
 Ribstein, Emergence, supra note 176, at 33. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit 6, § 17-219: 
Approval of conversion of a limited partnership. 
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business might become an LLC is to merge into one. With regards to merg-
ers, Ribstein notes that “[v]irtually all LLC statutes allow mergers among 
LLCs and often between LLCs and other types of business entities . . . [and] 
about one-third of the jurisdictions generally allow mergers between LLCs 
and other types of business entities.273 Ribstein notes, however, that “it may 
not be clear what the effects are of a transaction that fails to comply with 
statutory formalities . . . [and that] cross-entity merger and conversion pro-
visions may not fully integrate with the statute governing the non-LLC en-
tity.”274
Finally, all states now recognize foreign LLCs, meaning that nothing 
stands in the way of a business forming itself as an LLC in the state with 
the most flexible rules, and including a forum selection clause in its operat-
ing agreement to insure that disputes are settled in that state,275 and a choice 
of law clause as well.276
After examining possible scenarios that might arise with LLCs engag-
ing in third-party transactions in foreign states, Ribstein logically concludes 
that “[i]n general, when deciding which state’s law to apply, the courts 
should take into account both the costs and benefits of applying formation 
state law,”277 and notes that “[e]nforcing formation state law enhances pre-
dictability and often is consistent with the parties’ expectations.”278
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 
FOR THE LEGAL STATUS OF CORPORATIONS
The most significant problem that arises in supporting any assertion 
regarding the impact of the LLC lies in pinning down the nature of the LLC 
itself. This difficulty is reflected in the prefatory notes to the UCLLA, 
(a) Upon compliance with this section, a domestic limited partnership may convert to a corpora-
tion, a statutory trust, business trust or association, a real estate investment trust, a common-law 
trust or any other unincorporated business, including a general partnership (including a limited li-
ability partnership) or a foreign limited partnership (including a foreign limited liability limited 
partnership) or a limited liability company. 
273
 Ribstein, Emergence, supra note 176, at 33. 
274
 Id.
275
 Exactly such a provision that was at issue in Elf Atochem, 727 A.2d 286 discussed supra notes 
264-65 and accompanying text. In that case, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a choice-of-law provi-
sion in the operating agreement that required disputes between members to be settled in the courts of 
California. 
276
 Ribstein, Emergence, supra note 176, at 34. 
LLCs that want to do business as “foreign LLCs” are governed by their formation state law at least 
to the extent provided in the applicable foreign LLC statute. Although all LLC statutes require foreign 
LLCs transacting business in the state to register or qualify, the choice-of-law provisions apply to for-
eign LLCs irrespective of registration or qualification. 
277
 Id. at 38. 
278
 Id.
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which note that “[s]ince most state limited liability company acts are in 
their infancy, little if any interpretative case law exists,”279 and further con-
cede that “[e]ven when case law develops, it will have limited precedential 
value because of the diversity of the state acts.”280 However, while this 
comment does not seek to make any final determination as to whether the 
LLC is, in fact, a nexus of contracts entity, it does argue that the existence 
of the LLC disproves the nexus of contracts theory of corporations irrespec-
tive of the true nature of the LLC with regard to this theory. 
A. All Business Organizations Are Cost  
Avoidance Systems 
Although the LLC is generally discussed as an entity that captures the 
advantages offered by other business forms,281 it might be equally appropri-
ate to characterize it as an entity that avoids the disadvantages of all other 
business forms. Such a discussion might be a useful tool in determining the 
nature of the LLC without making an excessive effort to tie its characteris-
tics to forms that existed previously. For example, contractarians would 
very much like to claim that the LLC is a business entity that avoids manda-
tory fiduciary duties. If they are correct in this assertion, then the LLC is 
unlike any other previously existing business form.282 Therefore, rather than 
asserting that an LLC is “like a partnership” in some ways, and “like a cor-
poration” in other ways, I will continue to regard the LLC as a unique form 
that is “unlike a partnership” in that it avoids the disadvantages of a part-
nership, and “unlike a corporation” in that it avoids the disadvantages of a 
corporation. 
Indeed, any discussion of the benefits to be gained by employing a 
particular kind of business form is based on a false premise. No business 
form actually provides benefits; they only reduce or avoid costs. As Coase 
pointed out above, if there were no transaction costs involved in the con-
duct of business, there would be no need for any kind of business organiza-
tion whatsoever.283 Every person seeking to sell a service or manufacture 
and sell a product would be a sole proprietor. Each entrepreneur seeking to 
produce and market a new product would acquire loans to pay for the ven-
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ture;284 would hire on the spot all of the employees necessary for produc-
tion; and would purchase and sell all of the required materials on the open 
market. There would be no need for the creation of a partnership, a corpora-
tion, or some other form of limited liability business organization. If the 
product was unable to compete, the business would fail, and the entrepre-
neur would be held liable for whatever breaches of contract would result. If 
the product is defective and causes injury, then the entrepreneur would be 
required to pay to compensate the damage; and if the cost is too high, once 
again the business would fail. Such a business would truly and undeniably 
be a nexus of contracts. 
But, as noted above, transaction costs do exist in the real world,285 and 
those costs can be reduced through the formation of a formal business or-
ganization—a device that ties people together in long-term commitments to 
their roles and, more importantly, provides potential investors and creditors 
with a more appealing arrangement for the security of their resources. The 
business organization provides no benefits with respect to the conduct of 
the business itself. Simple logic suggests that an entrepreneur who piece-
meal contracts out every aspect of his production and sales cannot increase 
those sales by one penny simply by dint of arranging his business in a more 
acceptable form. The only thing that she can accomplish thereby is to re-
duce her costs of doing business—which will naturally leave more re-
sources for advertising, or quality control, or increased production, or to 
allow for a reduced price. But this reduction in transaction costs comes at a 
price of its own, and that price depends on the business form that the entre-
preneur chooses. 
In any business organization, the entrepreneur must surrender some 
autonomy. If she enters into a partnership, she will be powerless to make 
changes to the business without the consent of a majority of partners;286 and 
she will be held personally liable for the debts that other partners may incur 
upon the business. By incorporating, she escapes from that imposition of 
liability, but may be subject to compounded or higher taxes, strict regula-
tions, and the imposition of fiduciary duties to stockholders of the corpora-
tion. In each of these combinations, some potential cost is avoided, but only 
upon the acceptance of a different potential cost. 
Consider this example: I walk up to you and hit you in the head with a 
stick. You say “stop that!” and I reply, “I will, if you give me five dollars.” 
If you decide that it is worth five dollars to you not to be hit with a stick 
284
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again, and you therefore give me the five dollars to get me to stop, have you 
really purchased a benefit? Are you any better off than you would have 
been if you had pursued some other solution, such as running away, hitting 
me back, or calling the police? Only two things are certain in the above 
scenario. First, if I am an honorable businessman, then I will not hit you 
again (and if I do, then you may add breach of contract to the battery claim 
you would already have against me). Second, you are out five dollars. You 
have gained nothing, but have merely avoided the burden of being hit by 
substituting the more palatable burden of having fewer dollars in your 
pocket to buy the things you want. 
For this reason, reference to the acquisition of “limited liability” is a 
great misnomer. The more accurate, if also more cumbersome, term would 
be “avoidance of unlimited liability.” Avoidance of some amount of liabil-
ity, therefore, is no benefit, but merely a way around what would otherwise 
be a potential cost.287 In the same vein of thought, for a company to be taxed 
as a partnership, a Subchapter S corporation, or (now) an LLC is not a 
benefit, but merely an avoidance of a higher tax cost. But, like the five dol-
lars that you are willing to pay to avoid being hit, persons who wish to do 
business are willing to pay some kind of price such as unlimited liability for 
the wrongs committed by a business partner, or higher taxes, or restrictions 
on their management plan, or complex paperwork. The benefit that this 
sacrifice buys is the avoidance of transaction costs, because such costs 
make it impossible to conduct business on a large scale outside the structure 
of some business entity. 
Under this approach, the limited liability company ought not be de-
scribed as an effort to combine the benefits of other business forms, because 
business forms have no benefits. The LLC is therefore nothing more than a 
form designed to avoid as many costs as possible. It largely succeeds. 
Through this form, entrepreneurs can avoid most of the major burdens of 
doing business—transaction costs, unlimited liability, additional taxation, 
and imposition of mandatory fiduciary duties. The burdens that remain—
filing with the state and meeting some reporting requirements—are mini-
mal, and at any rate are no greater than similar requirements already im-
posed on most other business forms. The greatest danger inherent in at-
tempting to characterize the LLC as a combination of attributes held by 
other business forms is that such a characterization inevitably places the 
LLC under the heavy burden of common law precedent as applied to these 
other forms.  
287
 For a discussion of the general social and economic benefits purported to flow from the avail-
ability of limited liability to businesses, see EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 40-44. 
2006]    Application of the “Nexus of Contract” Theory to Corporations 235
B.     Parties Who Now Choose to Form a Corporation  
  Instead of a Limited Liability Company Have  
  Chosen to Accept the Associated Fiduciary Duties 
Because parties seeking to form a new business with the characteris-
tics of a pure “nexus of contracts” have this option available through the 
LLC, it can be assumed that those seeking to form a traditional corporation 
have chosen to accept the duties of operating under a business form more 
heavily constrained by principles that exist beyond the four corners of the 
documents by which the corporation is created and allowed to exist. In the 
modern business world, no competent businessperson would initiate a ma-
jor commercial venture without first consulting with an attorney and no 
competent attorney in any field of law related to business would be unaware 
of the existence of the LLC as a particularly enticing business form. 
C. Transferability of Business Forms 
As noted above, no legal mechanism stands in the way of the owners 
of an existing corporation reforming their business organization into an 
LLC. Indeed, the ULLCA contemplates the possibility of businesses shift-
ing from one form to another.288 A counter-argument might be made that the 
practical difficulty of making such a transformation increases exponentially 
as the size and complexity of the corporation in question increases. How-
ever, so long as such a transition is legally possible, decision-making based 
on the nexus of contracts theory with regard to the duties of traditional cor-
porations should nevertheless be abandoned. The interest in uniform and 
predictable application of the laws combined with the relatively minor po-
tential harm inherent in continuing to assign fiduciary duties to corporate 
managers both support this outcome.289
Despite recognizing that the development and proliferation of the LLC 
as a business form is a major event in the history of business organizations, 
theorists arguing both sides of the issue have ignored the possibility that the 
existence of the LLC has any effect whatsoever on the application of the 
nexus of contracts theory to corporations. Arguments instead center on the 
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question of whether fiduciary duties ought to be attributed to any business 
form, or to all business forms.290
D.  Irrelevance of the Actual Nature of the LLC 
If the corporation really is a nexus of contracts entity, then the LLC is 
redundant. After all, if courts were to follow the nexus of contracts theory, 
they would cease to apply fiduciary duties to corporations, and would nec-
essarily fall back on the law of contract to determine how disputes between 
parties to the corporation should be settled. The corporation would then be 
able to arrange its affairs with respect to its constituent parties in whatever 
manner it desired, and would be indistinguishable from an LLC having the 
same ability. However, it is a venerable canon of statutory construction 
“that courts should ‘avoid a reading of statutory language which renders 
some words altogether redundant.’”291 Therefore, where a state enacts a 
statute creating a new form of business organization, the courts must pre-
sume that the state intended for this new form to have characteristics that 
distinguish it from all existing forms. As noted above, courts have estab-
lished heightened fiduciary duties for close corporations. Many LLCs re-
semble close corporations, but this has not prevented courts from honoring 
waivers of corporate-type fiduciary duties found in their operating agree-
ments.292
If the LLC itself is not truly a nexus of contracts and is, in fact, deter-
mined to be subject to fiduciary duties as an enterprise (as the court in Salm 
v. Feldstein determined),293 then the continued treatment of corporations as 
an enterprise subject to fiduciary duties seems all the more reasonable by 
comparison. If it is appropriate to lay such duties on an entity that much 
more closely resembles a nexus of contracts, then it is impossible for a less 
contractarian entity to expect to avoid those duties. A simple metaphor is a 
children’s amusement park ride with a posted height limit. If the five-foot 
tall teen is told he is too tall to ride, his six-foot tall older brother need not 
even step in the line.  
The need for certainty underscores the irrelevance of the true nature of 
the LLC. Although there may be great utility to the establishment of a true 
nexus of contracts entity, there exists a degree of stability and reassurance 
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in the continued assessment of such duties to corporations, in the face of 
uncertainty about the contractarian nature of the LLC. 
V. CONCLUSION
The uniform availability of the LLC as a business form should elimi-
nate any reason for treating the corporation as anything other than an enter-
prise—a separate entity whose existence calls into play certain duties owed 
to it by its managers, irrespective of what is laid out on paper.294 One com-
mentator suggests that political concerns will determine which view the 
courts ultimately take, predicting that “American fears of concentrated 
wealth will not be placated by the legislature defining an LLC as a contract 
between two private parties.”295 This comment disagrees, and expects that 
courts will at least treat smaller LLCs—those that are akin to close corpora-
tions in size and scope—as though they are mere contractual agreements 
between the members. 
It is only when LLCs approach the scale of billion-dollar businesses, 
with third parties purchasing some form of interests in the LLC that are 
distinguishable from the current membership, that courts should determine 
that this business form has entered the realm of those corporate forms that 
should be assessed as having fiduciary duties. At that point, courts will 
naturally arrive at approximately the same distinction that already separates 
close corporations from their publicly held counterparts. Even then, every 
dispute involving the duties owed one another by members of an LLC 
should be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, for (unless boilerplate LLC 
formation language comes into vogue) each LLC will be governed by a 
unique document that represents the desires of the parties involved. But for 
those who choose to maintain or create new corporations, the courts should 
not hesitate to assess the full array of traditional fiduciary duties. Two pos-
sibilities support this outcome. Either the corporation is not a nexus of con-
tracts entity because the LLC is one, and the law would not allow redundant 
business forms; or the corporation was never a nexus of contracts entity 
because even the more contractarian LLC is also not one. 
It is entirely possible that the crucible of litigation will reveal the LLC 
to be the true nexus of contracts entity that contractarians claim it is, and 
perhaps courts ought to permit the experiments in this direction by states 
such as Delaware to go forward unhindered. In so doing, the benefits and 
burdens of permitting such a structure to exist will be exposed, and the con-
tention of the contractarians that such a form will self-regulate to the best 
interests of all parties involved will be put to the test. Should this experi-
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ment succeed, contractarians will have their nexus of contracts entity, and 
anti-contractarians will still be able to point to the corporation as proof that 
even the nexus of contracts entity is only a creature of the state, and not 
necessarily the best practicable arrangement. 
Based on the above factors, courts before whom the issue is raised—
and legislatures and legal scholars in general—should recognize that the 
existence of the limited liability company as a business form renders obso-
lete the argument that a nexus of contracts model should apply to the corpo-
rate business form. 
